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I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law has an interpretation problem that is in need of re-
form. Judges routinely face complex interpretive choices when they 
resolve disputes over potentially copyrightable works. Judges choose 
whether to resolve an issue as a matter of law, whether to admit — or 
even require — extrinsic evidence that may be relevant to their inter-
pretation, and whether to rely on judicial intuition or formal analysis 
in their decision-making. The interpretive choices that judges make 
about works have played an important but unacknowledged role in 
outcomes of cases involving screenplays, architecture, novels, pop 
songs, nonfiction works, and photography. 
The problem can be simplified to two choices: Judges must de-
termine what they should use as the sources of their interpretation, 
and how they should interpret the works being litigated. These com-
peting interpretive methods require judges to choose among different 
sources: the work itself, and the context around the work, including its 
reception, the author’s intentions, or expert opinions. Further, judges 
must decide whether to produce formalist analysis applying copyright 
doctrines or to offer conclusions with little more than judicial intuition 
to show their reasoning. 
Even though judges in copyright cases face potentially outcome-
relevant choices among competing sources of interpretation, their se-
lection of interpretive methods has been almost entirely overlooked by 
scholars and judges alike. Indeed, the very existence of interpretive 
choices as a crucial methodological question in copyright cases has 
not yet been widely acknowledged. This Article addresses that gap in 
scholarship by demonstrating that interpretive choices are ubiquitous 
and necessary in copyright litigation and by illuminating the compet-
ing methods and sources that judges select from when they make their 
interpretive decisions. 
Copyright’s interpretive choice regime controls questions of ma-
jor importance for the parties, such as whether an issue is a matter of 
law or fact, whether an issue may be decided at summary judgment, 
whether expert testimony is allowed, and whether a use is fair. The 
resulting lack of transparency characterizing copyright’s interpretive 
practices creates unpredictability and unfairness for the parties. As a 
function of interpretive choice, works of art may escape destruction if 
found non-infringing;1 movies may get made or languish as legal dis-
                                                                                                                  
1. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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putes get ironed out;2 novels may get banned or declared a fair use;3 
fan works may be threatened.4 Ultimately, awareness of interpretive 
choice helps us to evaluate the proper allocation and scope of deci-
sional authority, to properly characterize issues, and to identify the 
best tools to use in copyright’s interpretive work. The Article con-
cludes with a call for greater methodological transparency, and it of-
fers a few modest prescriptions about which interpretive methods 
might be best adopted, by whom, when, and why. It proposes that 
judges in copyright cases incline more toward analysis than intuition 
and prioritize text over context, as default settings. 
This Article describes two dimensions of largely unacknowledged 
and unconstrained realms of interpretive complexity that judges face. 
First, judges make decisions about sources of interpretive authority 
somewhere on an axis, one end of which would vest interpretive au-
thority entirely in the text5 and the other entirely in the context,6 
around or beyond the text. This Article terms this spectrum of judicial 
decision-making the Text/Context axis. Second, judges must decide 
what interpretive mode to use in approaching the text, and here they 
make decisions somewhere along an axis where one end represents 
analysis or exegesis of the works and the other end represents judicial 
intuition.7 This Article terms this second realm of copyright’s inter-
pretive complexity the Analysis/Intuition axis. These two axes help 
explain copyright’s interpretive choice regime. Along the Analy-
sis/Intuition axis, judges must decide whether (1) to offer affirmative 
analysis of the text of the works at issue, explaining their reasoning 
but perhaps constraining their future decision-making and leaving 
them vulnerable to greater reversal rates, or (2) to offer conclusions 
about the works at issue, justified by what appears to be little more 
                                                                                                                  
2. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936); Effie 
Film, LLC v. Murphy, 932 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
3. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001). 
4. See Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
5. By “text,” I mean any potentially copyrightable work at issue in copyright litigation, 
whether or not it contains actual “text.” Consequently, when this Article refers to “texts,” it 
includes works of literature, music, film, visual art, and so on. The word “text” is a term 
drawn from semiotic and aesthetic theories of interpretation, where it has a meaning 
independent of meanings in law. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 
THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 2–3, 303–10 (1980) (describing a 
formalist notion of the text as stable and a “self-sufficient repository of meaning” but 
advancing his own contrary theory of interpretive authority, namely, that the text cannot 
generate meaning without a reader actualizing it, subject to linguistic, institutional, and 
other constraints). 
6. By “context,” I mean the context “external” to the work, such as statements of 
authorial intention, evidence of reader response and expert opinions. 
7. By “analysis,” I mean focused discussion of the works at issue as texts that can be 
interpreted through exposition of “textual evidence,” such as scenes from a film, shapes in a 
painting, literary language, characters, and musical structures. 
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than judicial intuition. Along the Text/Context axis, when considering 
potentially copyrightable works, whether judging them through analy-
sis or through intuition, judges must decide (1) whether to focus on 
the work itself (a text-based approach) or (2) to consider the context 
around the work (a contextualist approach).  
Both of these interpretive axes, Analysis/Intuition and 
Text/Context, directly implicate important doctrinal and evidentiary 
questions in copyright law. In other words, these complex interpretive 
questions can change the outcome of individual cases. Indeed, they 
raise a question that has been fundamental in law and literature as a 
question of power: “Who or what ‘controls’ the meaning of a text — 
the author, the reader, the words of the text, [or] conventions of read-
ing?”8 A judge, as a reader, derives meaning through interpretive 
choices; it is in relying on one or more of these grounds — author, 
reader, text, or conventions — that the reader makes a claim to inter-
pretive authoritativeness.9 Yet despite their import for legal outcomes, 
these interpretive choices rarely receive explicit treatment as such. 
The various combinations of choices along the pair of axes exist 
among a range of possible modalities of interpretation, no one of them 
necessarily more correct than another. Judges can apply text-based, 
contextualist, or other interpretive lenses, and indeed they do.10 In 
fact, judicial decisions along the Analysis/Intuition axis may strong-
ly — yet at the moment, invisibly — influence the decision-making 
process, including some of the determinative issues on the 
Text/Context axis, ultimately implicating crucial doctrinal and eviden-
tiary questions in copyright law. 
These interpretive choices may also dictate whether questions 
may be resolved by the judge as a matter of law or whether they re-
quire further consideration by a jury or a judge acting as the trier of 
fact. Furthermore, interpretive choice may determine what level of 
constraint a judge will impose on her own analysis to ensure its legit-
imacy: Is judicial fiat (or gestalt) sufficient, or must the judge “show 
her work,” that is, “give reasons”?11 This Article will demonstrate that 
                                                                                                                  
8. Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 
1059, 1071 (1999). 
9. Interpretive authority is a term of art in the humanities, associated with producing a 
disciplined or reliable reading of a text, and at times challenged or destabilized as a concept 
because no such reliable reading is possible. See FISH, supra note 5, at 13, 14, 301. It is thus 
different from the term “interpretive authority” as understood in law, where the term is more 
commonly used in the context of the delegation of interpretive power from Congress to 
agencies in administrative law. See Jeffrey Wertkin, Reintroducing Compromise to the 
NonDelegation Doctrine, 90 GEO. L.J. 1055, 1076. In the humanities, the concept of 
interpretive authority refers to the justifications for the interpreter’s interpretation; in law, it 
refers to who possesses the right — as a matter of democratic design — to decide what a 
statute or rule may mean. 
10. See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
247, 251 (1998). 
11. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 43 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633–34 (1995). 
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judges make choices between an analytical mode and an intuitive one 
in how they choose to interpret works, even though these choices rare-
ly surface as such. 
This Article recasts interpretive choices as integral to copyright 
law: They make the law operate properly. Copyright adjudication re-
quires judges to adopt interpretive methodologies, whether or not they 
address them explicitly.12 Interpretive choices can offer some explana-
tion for the great divergence in outcomes and reasoning seen in in-
fringement analysis more generally. Recognizing its importance can 
improve the cogency of copyright doctrine throughout litigation. 
Relatedly, exploring the impact interpretive choice has on copy-
right litigation helps expose two pernicious assumptions that recur in 
case law: first, that nontechnical copyrightable works, that is, involv-
ing art rather than works of technology such as software, are not com-
plex; second, that analyzing such artistic works is not difficult.13 In 
fact, the reigning view is that judges presiding in copyright litigation 
over nontechnical works have it easy.14 In reality, judges, even in so-
called nontechnical copyright cases, often operate under interpretive 
conditions of considerable “empirical uncertainty.”15 It is no surprise 
then, that judges may seem unclear about the import of their methodo-
logical selection when they interpret the works at issue. Just as patent 
law requires “technological engagement” of judges,16 copyright law 
requires a kind of interpretive engagement, in the form of selecting 
interpretive methods along two axes of complexity. 
It ought to be stated that acknowledging copyright’s complexity 
does not mean that interpreting works for the purposes of copyright 
litigation is hopeless or that the works themselves are semiotically 
                                                                                                                  
12. Both Farley and Yen discuss the range of possible aesthetic (or interpretive) theories, 
from intentionalism to aesthetic pragmatism. See Yen, supra note 10; Christine Haight 
Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 845–46 (2006). But neither of them focuses on 
how these theories reflect interpretive methodologies that, elsewhere, the law recognizes as 
legally significant choices. I concur with Professor Yen that each “move to a new analytical 
perspective is itself a decision of aesthetic significance.” Yen, supra note 10, at 250. 
However, I am more interested in the fact that shifts in perspective point to 
unacknowledged, legally relevant choices about interpretive method. 
13. I adopt the term “nontechnical” based on its use in prior case law. See, e.g., 
Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 295–96 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that expert 
testimony will not generally be permitted or necessary if the subject matter is not “complex 
or technical”); Price v. Fox Entm’t Group, 499 F. Supp. 2d 382, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“These are not highly technical works. The jury is capable of recognizing and 
understanding the similarities between the works without the help of an expert.”). 
14. See, e.g., Gable v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 815, 834 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“[T]he Court recognizes that the task of comparing two fiction works is not highly 
technical, and indeed requires no specific training . . . .”), aff’d, Gable v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 
438 F. App’x 587, 588 (9th Cir. 2011). 
15. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 76 (2000) 
(“[M]any debates over interpretive doctrine are of this character, and should be reframed as 
problems of choosing optimal interpretive doctrine under conditions of severe empirical 
uncertainty.”). 
16. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2010). 
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indeterminate. It is important to distinguish between the complexity of 
the works and their hermeneutic indeterminacy. The former refers to 
interpretive complexity in law, which could lead to different legal 
outcomes; the latter refers to indeterminacy in semiotic or hermeneu-
tic theory — that works are susceptible to many readings and can 
mean different things for different readers — for non-legal purposes 
such as art criticism, literary analysis, reading, rewriting, and even 
other functional uses of copyrightable works. And neither of these is 
the same as legal indeterminacy, which is the idea that some answers 
to legal questions are unknowable.17 So long as the interpretation of 
the work is not serving litigation or other legal purposes, the indeter-
minacy of the work’s meaning need not concern us. However, in cop-
yright litigation, the works at issue must be interpreted for legal 
purposes, and here it is indisputable not only that a fixed meaning 
may attach but that frequently for an outcome to be reached, it must 
attach so that copyright doctrines can be applied. This is nothing new, 
from the vantage point of law and humanities, which concerned itself 
with this debate over meaning at its outset.18 It has likewise been dis-
cussed in patent law to considerable extent already, in the context of 
the determinacy of patent claims.19 
Here, this Article makes no claims about the indeterminacy of 
textual meaning, or what we might term the “semiotic indeterminacy 
thesis” which interested early law-and-literature scholars.20 Instead, 
this Article aspires to show that something else important and little 
remarked upon is taking place. Judges make difficult interpretive 
choices that can be helpfully viewed as taking place along two pre-
                                                                                                                  
17. Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 339, 341 
(1996) (“[A] proposition of law . . . is indeterminate if the materials of legal analysis — the 
accepted sources of law and the accepted methods of working with those sources such as 
deduction and analogy — are insufficient to resolve the question, ‘Is this proposition or its 
denial a correct statement of the law?’”). 
18. A distillation of that debate might be many meanings: literature; a single meaning: 
law. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and 
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982); Michael Pantazakos, The Form of Ambiguity: Law, 
Literature, and the Meaning of Meaning, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 199, 217 
(1998) (“[L]aw is not nor should it be taught as only what we say it is. Law is not mere 
formulas but forms. However . . . [this] does not mean nor should it be taught to mean that 
these alternatives necessarily define law as a formless relativism.”). 
19. An excellent variation on this discussion of interpretive determinacy has clarified its 
import for debates over meaning in patent claim construction. Professors T.J. Chiang and 
Lawrence Solum have argued that the indeterminacy inherent in claim construction (the 
claim’s linguistic elements) does not typically drive patent litigation, which is instead 
determined by policy choices judges make about what role claim construction should play. 
Their identification of what they term the “linguistic indeterminacy thesis” helps them 
accurately diagnose what ails patent law. Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The 
Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 534 (2013). That 
fine distinction holds here too, if the potential indeterminacy of texts, that is, their 
susceptibility to multiple meanings, is isolated and identified as “semiotic indeterminacy.” 
20. See generally Guyora Binder, “What’s Left: Beyond Critique: Law, Culture, and the 
Politics of Form,” 69 TEX. L. REV. 1985 (1991). 
No. 2] Reforming Copyright Interpretation 475 
 
dictable axes of complexity. The actual range of interpretive methods 
used by judges contains many variations, but for conceptual clarity 
distilling those choices into two pairings — Analytical/Intuitive and 
Text/Context — helps illuminate the impact the interpretive method 
has on the outcome of a case. 
Accordingly, this Article seeks to make several contributions. 
First, it offers a descriptive theory of copyright’s interpretive practices 
by showing multiple points at which judges do, and indeed must, 
make complex but often unacknowledged interpretive decisions, 
along two different but interrelated axes.21 Second, it shows that judg-
es make legally meaningful, but inconsistent, decisions about interpre-
tive methods in copyright cases. The Article calls for greater 
methodological transparency, and it offers a few modest prescriptions 
about which interpretive methods might be best adopted, by whom, 
when, and why. It proposes that judges in copyright cases should be 
more inclined toward analysis than intuition and prioritize text over 
context, as default settings. Copyright law could benefit from a rule-
structured analytic system, a set of interpretive defaults that 
(1) prioritize analysis over intuition and (2) focus first on the work but 
then allow a reasonable “escape route,” or methodological second tier, 
to soften the possible harshness of the rule-based approach. A turn to 
analysis and an emphasis on text could constrain judicial discretion 
and steer judges toward more transparent reasoning. In turn, these 
interpretive defaults could help produce greater consistency and fair-
ness. Part II shows how interpretive choices are built into copyright 
law along two interrelated axes of complexity and provides examples 
of cases in which judges make inconsistent choices along these inter-
pretive axes in ways that can affect outcomes. It shows that there is 
little coherence or consistency in judicial method selection and that 
there is confusion about what might even count as a method. Part III 
argues against the reigning view that so-called nontechnical copyright 
cases are somehow interpretively simpler than technical ones, such as 
software cases. Part IV proposes a turn toward analysis and away 
from intuitionism, along with greater judicial emphasis on texts over 
context. Part V concludes. 
II. JUDGES MAKE NECESSARY AND DIVERGENT INTERPRETIVE 
CHOICES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
Copyright adjudication requires that judges select among interpre-
tive choices in order to resolve the basic issues at the heart of any dis-
pute, but copyright scholarship has only begun to acknowledge the 
                                                                                                                  
21. Even avoiding interpretation and aesthetic theories reflects an implicit 
methodological decision, a tendency toward “intuitionism” and conclusory analysis. See 
infra Part II.D.2. 
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extent to which judges may be making or avoiding interpretive deci-
sions. Professor Tushnet’s pioneering scholarship on judicial interpre-
tation of images has shown that judges do make what amount to 
methodological choices about visual works they confront in copyright 
cases.22 Professor Yen’s work laid crucial groundwork by positing 
that aesthetic theories parallel judicial reasoning in copyright law, 
thus showing that judges necessarily make interpretive choices.23 Pro-
fessor Farley’s scholarship similarly revealed the substantial role 
played by judicial intuition in the adjudication of works of art under-
scoring the ubiquity of judicial choice.24 Other works contributed to a 
scholarly conversation largely focused on aesthetic issues and objec-
tivity in copyright adjudication.25 The interpretive problem addressed 
herein is broader than that. It is methodological, not purely aesthetic 
or evaluative. Further, it is confined neither to one particular meth-
odological approach,26 nor to one class of works, such as visual or 
musical works, where earlier scholars have focused.27 Most crucially, 
interpretive choices play a direct role in litigation, or at least they can. 
All potentially copyrightable works force judges to grapple with in-
terpretive questions that copyright scholarship has overlooked as a 
legally relevant methodological issue.28 The extant literature on inter-
pretive choice in copyright law is thus promising but incomplete.  
A range of possible interpretive methods exists, but for the pur-
poses of conceptual clarity, this Article distills the interpretive options 
                                                                                                                  
22. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 683 (2012). 
23. Yen, supra note 10, at 250. I note that Yen’s footnotes draw mostly on primary 
sources (cases) and on secondary sources external to law (such as art theory). I take that as 
evidence that the state of scholarship on copyright’s interpretive practices was 
underdeveloped before Yen’s seminal, interdisciplinary article. 
24. Farley, supra note 12, at 845–46. 
25. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Contradiction and Context in American Copyright Law, 9 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 305–07 (1991); Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the 
Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value 
Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 184–95 (1990); Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright 
Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719 
(1987). 
26. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader 
Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 (2008); H. Brian Holland, Social Semiotics in the 
Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2011); Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad 
Reviewers: Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW & LIT. 20 (2013); Elizabeth 
Winkowski, A Context-Sensitive Inquiry: The Interpretation of Meaning in Cases of Visual 
Appropriation Art, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 746 (2013). 
27. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 22; Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom To Copy: 
Copyright, Creation and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477 (2007); Olufunmilayo B. 
Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006); Melissa M. Mathis, Note, Function, Nonfunction, and 
Monumental Works of Architecture: An Interpretive Lens in Copyright Law, 22 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 595 (2001); Jessica Silbey, Images in/of Film, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 171 (2012–
13). 
28. Zahr Kassim Said, Only Part of the Picture: A Response to Professor Tushnet’s 
Worth a Thousand Words, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 349 (2013). 
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by relying on the interrelated complexities of the Analysis/Intuition 
axis and the Text/Context axis. Copyright requires that judges make 
interpretive choices about how they will interpret the works at issue 
and what they will focus on in the course of their interpretive work. 
In order to understand the effect and operation of copyright’s in-
terpretive choice regime, it is first necessary to situate these interpre-
tive choices in copyright law. Part II.A sketches the trajectory of a 
standard copyright infringement case and shows that, at multiple 
points in copyright’s analytic trajectory, the adjudication of expressive 
works requires that judges make decisions about the method of inter-
pretation they will use. Part II.B shows that many interpretive modali-
ties exist for judges to select. Part II.C fleshes out the operation of 
interpretive choice in the copyright context and provides examples of 
cases that illuminate the complexity of the Analysis/Intuition axis, 
when courts choose analysis, intuition, or a point somewhere between 
the two. Part II.D focuses on the interpretive complexity of the 
Text/Context axis that requires judges to focus their attention on a 
source of interpretive authority at different points in the litigation. 
A. Copyright Cases Follow an Analytical Trajectory 
Interpretive choice is a feature, not a bug, in copyright law. To as-
sert a valid claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show 
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying . . . of protectable 
elements of the work.”29 The first step is typically straightforward. 
Once copyright ownership of a registered copyright has been proven, 
the analysis in a copyright infringement claim involves two distinct 
inquiries: whether a work was copied and whether any such copying 
was improper.30 The first inquiry can be answered with the defend-
ant’s admission or other direct evidence of copying,31 but in practice, 
these are rarely available.32 More typically, copying is proven through 
a two-pronged inferential analysis: (1) proof of defendant’s access to 
the copied work and (2) substantial similarity between the plaintiff’s 
work and the defendant’s work.33 The term substantial similarity is 
confusing because it arises at two different stages: first, when plain-
tiffs must prove copying; second, when they must prove that the copy-
ing was improper. The general rule is that expert evidence may be 
admissible on the question of substantial similarity on the copying 
                                                                                                                  
29. CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1999). 
30. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
31. See Boisson v. Banian, 273 F.3d 262, 267 (2d Cir. 2001). 
32. Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2003).  
33. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1164 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 
1976); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
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inquiry,34 when it is sometimes helpfully referred to as probative simi-
larity.35 This inquiry is a question of law, deemed to be well-suited for 
disposition by a judge.36 
The inquiry on substantial similarity with respect to improper 
copying determines whether the copying was the sort that is legally 
actionable.37 The court must determine, theoretically as a question of 
fact, whether the similarities between the works pertain to copyrighta-
ble material and not simply to unprotectable ideas.38 At this stage, the 
court again considers the substantial similarity of plaintiff’s and de-
fendant’s works, only this time the standard is typically that of the lay 
observer, not the expert.39 In fact, expert testimony is generally inad-
missible on this point.40 At this phase, substantial similarity is some-
thing the ordinary observer can and must discern without the aid of an 
expert witness.41 It is considered a subjective inquiry that goes to the 
jury unless a judge finds that no reasonable juror could find substan-
tial similarity.42 In practice, judges often make the determination of 
substantial similarity on early motions and also in lieu of a jury. This 
brief outline constitutes the analytic trajectory for a judge to follow in 
a copyright infringement case.43 
Within this trajectory, doctrinal questions, such as the 
idea/expression dichotomy, merger, conceptual separability, and 
scènes à faire also make interpretive demands on judges. Each of the 
core requirements for copyrightability, a threshold inquiry in copy-
right law, implicates some aesthetic or interpretive theory. Copyright 
                                                                                                                  
34. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
35. Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some 
Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990). 
36. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
37. 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 
(2014). 
38. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980). 
39. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
40. An exception exists where works, such as software, are thought to be sufficiently 
complex that a jury or factfinder would be unable to make a determination without expert 
assistance. Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 733 (2010). 
41. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001); Castle 
Rock Entertm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1998); Shaw v. 
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1990). 
42. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2004). 
43. My account here is intended as a descriptive, uncontroversial account of the way 
copyright cases are structured, and it draws on the dominant accounts of copyright law 
found in the most oft-cited opinions and treatises. However, other scholars have lamented 
many aspects of the structure of copyright infringement analysis, and their critiques 
populate the footnotes of this Article. Notably, one scholar has called one aspect of 
substantial similarity analysis — the admissibility of expert evidence — “exactly 
backwards.” Lemley, supra note 40, at 736. Another writes that “[o]ur current treatment of 
infringement, which asks whether there is ‘substantial similarity’ between two works, makes 
impossible and self-contradictory demands on factfinders . . . .” Tushnet, supra note 22, at 
687–88. 
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protection extends only to “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”44 The qualifying requirements of 
copyright can thus be enumerated as follows: originality, status as a 
work, authorship as the Act defines the term, and fixation in a tangible 
medium.45 How does one find originality? What counts as a work? 
What are the boundaries of authorship? What does fixation look like 
in the digital world? Or in the natural world? Each of these issues cre-
ates an interpretive pressure point, at which judges must select an in-
terpretive method. 
Copyrightability provides fertile terrain for exploring interpretive 
pressure points because it is both a threshold inquiry for copyright law 
and up to the judge to decide. Because copyrightability is a question 
of law, it empowers judges to determine the question with considera-
ble discretion and without the need for fact-finding.46 Efforts by par-
ties to include expert testimony on this question have often been 
unsuccessful, and judges continue to assert their own authority, inde-
pendent of expert guidance.47 
Yet folded into the determination of originality are necessarily in-
terpretive decisions about which not all judges are explicit. Some 
seem to ignore these choices altogether; others recognize these choic-
es but seek to avoid the appearance of making a choice not properly 
for the determination of a judge.48 Determining a work’s copyrighta-
bility may require all of the following: determination of its originali-
ty;49 inquiry into whether its form and context meet copyright law’s 
fixation requirement;50 determination of whether its form and context 
are useful,51 and thus excluded from copyright protection; and idea-
expression analysis, including a filtering of elements that should re-
main in the public domain (such as ideas, historical facts, or scènes à 
faire) from those that can be protected under copyright.52 To resolve 
                                                                                                                  
44. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
45. 4-13 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37. 
46. 3-12 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, § 12.10. 
47. Delightful examples of turf-protecting dicta populate cases, such as: “If the court 
determines that mannequin heads are copyrightable subject matter, the jury will be so 
instructed . . . . There is no need for expert testimony on this subject; in a trial there is only 
one legal expert — the judge.” Pivot Point Int’l v. Charlene Prods., 932 F. Supp. 220, 225 
(N.D. Ill. 1996); see also infra Part II.D. 
48. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Artistic originality 
indeed might inhere in a detail, a nuance, a shading too small to be apprehended by a 
judge.”); infra Part II.D (observing that courts fear to make aesthetic judgments).  
49. Section 102(a) extends copyright protection only to “original works of authorship.” 2 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:26. 
50. Goldstein v. Cal., 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
51. 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:145. 
52. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 544 (1985) 
(“[S]imilarities between the original and the challenged work traceable to the copying or 
paraphrasing of uncopyrightable material, such as historical facts, memoranda and other 
public documents, and quoted remarks of third parties, must be disregarded in evaluating 
whether the second author’s use was fair or infringing.”). 
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these inherent copyright issues, judges make legally meaningful inter-
pretive choices, with little meaningful guidance about how to do so 
and many competing options at their disposal.53 
B. Many Interpretive Modalities Exist 
Interpretive issues are tightly interwoven with most of the sub-
stantive questions that make up a copyright infringement case. Most 
issues that arise can be considered subsets of these three main group-
ings: copyrightability, improper copying, and defenses. Interpretive 
pressure points, like the ones raised by these doctrines, are present and 
inevitable in copyright law. And at each of these pressure points, 
judges may select from among a number of possible interpretive 
methods. 
When judges decide how to interpret, they are making choices 
along the Analysis/Intuition axis, and when they decide on what to 
focus, they must make choices along the Text/Context axis.54 The 
range of interpretive methods corresponds roughly to different aes-
thetic theories of art. The seminal article on this topic is by Professor 
Yen, who categorizes the major schools of interpretive theory as for-
malism, intentionalism, and institutionalism, and tracks their deploy-
ment in copyright cases.55 Yen’s article draws on art history, and his 
categories make sense in that context. It could be argued, mistakenly, 
that the impact of Yen’s scholarship is limited to cases in which the 
works at issue are artistic ones, such as plays, paintings, or novels. On 
the contrary, these aesthetic and interpretive issues arise in all copy-
right litigation. Hence, for the purposes of this Article, the emphasis 
lies less on the aesthetic nature of the works and their interpretive 
puzzles, and instead more on the interpretive complexity that copy-
right litigation itself produces. This complexity requires that judges 
decide how to interpret works at issue and on what to base their inter-
pretive authority. 
                                                                                                                  
53. See Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (stating that it is “problematic . . . that there are too many 
different tests [for copyright infringement] and not enough guidance about which one to use 
in what kinds of cases” and calling for courts to “give more guidance about what constitutes 
protectable expression in copyrighted works and what aspects, besides abstract ideas, are 
unprotectable by copyright”). 
54. This paradigm is neither purely literary, which would require more categories, nor 
purely legal, which would require engagement with existing, but heavily overdetermined 
terms, like textualism, originalism, and purposivism. Instead, it draws on literary and 
aesthetic theories but addresses the realities of copyright litigation. For example, this 
interdisciplinary classification reflects awareness of the role admissibility of evidence plays, 
as well as the legal significance of allocating decision-making power, and it focuses on the 
practical importance of interpretive theories for copyright’s substance and procedure. 
55. Yen, supra note 10. 
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C. Courts Disagree over What Methods and Sources To Use 
Courts often disagree about the proper interpretive choices, as a 
recent example makes plain. In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held twenty-five of thirty paintings by the defend-
ant, an appropriation artist, to be making fair use of the photographer 
Patrick Cariou’s work.56 It reversed and remanded as to the remaining 
paintings, on which Judge Deborah Batts of the Southern District of 
New York had previously granted plaintiff injunctive relief.57 The 
parties settled as to the last five paintings.58 In my reading of the case, 
the grounds for the Second Circuit’s reversal lie in a rejection of 
Judge Batts’s interpretive choices. 
Patrick Cariou is a photographer who produced a book of por-
traits of Jamaican Rastafarians and photographs of the Jamaican land-
scape for a book called Yes, Rasta.59 Richard Prince is a well-known 
appropriation artist who purchased a copy of Yes, Rasta and then re-
moved and reused the photos as the basis for an exhibition of his own, 
entitled “Canal Zone.”60 Cariou sued Prince, as well as Larry Gag-
osian, the gallery owner who was to exhibit “Canal Zone” in Manhat-
tan.61 Prince readily admitted to unauthorized use of Cariou’s 
photographs, which could normally constitute copyright infringe-
ment.62 In Prince’s case, however, his lawyers argued that he had 
transformed the works and therefore could claim fair use.63 Judge 
Batts rejected defendants’ theory, finding it difficult to square a claim 
of semiotic transformativeness with Prince’s deposition, in which he 
admitted that he had not intended any particular message to comment 
on Cariou’s artwork.64 Grounding her interpretive authority in 
Prince’s authorial intentions,65 she granted Cariou injunctive relief, 
which would have permitted Cariou to seize and destroy the several 
dozen paintings in the “Canal Zone” exhibit.66 
                                                                                                                  
56. 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013). 
57. Id. at 698–99. 
58. Randy Kennedy, Richard Prince Settles Copyright Suit with Patrick Cariou over 
Photographs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:23 PM), available at 
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/richard-prince-settles-copyright-suit-with-
patrick-cariou-over-photographs/. 
59. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 342. 
62. See id. at 344. 
63. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 14–16, Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 108-CV-
11327). 
64. See Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
65. See id. (“Prince did not intend to comment on Cariou, on Cariou’s Photos, or on 
aspects of popular culture closely associated with Cariou or the Photos when he 
appropriated the Photos, and Prince’s own testimony-shows [sic] that his intent was not 
transformative within the meaning of Section 107 . . . .”). 
66. Id. at 355. 
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Judge Batts’s reasoning was facially appropriate, if the remedy 
she selected seems somewhat draconian. Batts followed Rogers v. 
Koons, a case which had stressed the need for a fair user to comment 
on the work,67 and defined transformativeness narrowly: “Prince’s 
Paintings are transformative only to the extent that they comment on 
[Cariou’s] Photos.”68 She found the works could not possibly be trans-
formative because Prince had, by his own admission, no intention of 
commenting on the underlying works.69 Instead, he had testified that 
he wished to use the photos as facts, for their truth value.70 
The Second Circuit reversed and remanded in terms that delivered 
something of a rebuke.71 The Second Circuit held that all but five of 
the paintings were fair use, and the remaining ones were to be consid-
ered anew by the district court.72 The key holding of the decision on 
appeal was that Judge Batts had applied an incorrect legal standard for 
determining transformativeness by rigidly applying the Rogers stand-
ard73 and by emphasizing the author’s intent rather than the reasona-
ble observer’s perception of the work.74 In the terms of this Article’s 
argument, Batts prioritized authorial intention over other sources of 
interpretive authority, such as text, audience reception, or expert tes-
timony. Choosing authorial intention reflected a particular methodol-
ogy that Batts selected without discussion and that arguably provided 
the grounds for Cariou’s reversal, when the Second Circuit disavowed 
Batts’s legal analysis.75 
The choices over interpretive methods in the Cariou litigation are 
neither unique nor simple. Judges must — and routinely do — make 
methodological choices regarding whether to produce analysis or of-
fer intuition and where to locate their interpretive authority. Depend-
                                                                                                                  
67. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.1992) 
68. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.  
69. See id. 
70. Id. (“Prince also testified that his purpose in appropriating other people’s originals for 
use in his artwork is that doing so helps him ‘get as much fact into [his] work and reduce[] 
the amount of speculation.’”). 
71. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706 (“As even Cariou concedes, however, the district court’s 
legal premise was not correct. The law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the 
original or its author in order to be considered transformative.”). 
72. Id. at 712. 
73. See Kim J. Landsman, Does Cariou v. Prince Represent the Apogee or Burn-Out of 
Transformativeness in Fair Use Jurisprudence? A Plea for A Neo-Traditional Approach, 24 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 321, 341–42 (2014). 
74. See Kathleen K. Olson, The Future of Fair Use, 19 COMM. L. & POL’Y 417, 428–29, 
431 (“The Second Circuit in Cariou discounted the artistic intent of the secondary user and 
substituted its own judgment as part of its ‘reasonable observer’ standard for judging 
whether a different expressive purpose was present in the secondary work.”). 
75. It is worth noting that Batts’s choice was not unreasonable in its methodology, even if 
it was ultimately overruled. Authorial intention remained sufficiently viable that it animated 
the dissent of the Second Circuit’s Judge Wallace. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 713 (“Unlike the 
majority . . . I view Prince’s statements — which, as Prince acknowledges, consist of ‘his 
view of the purpose and effect of each of the individual [p]aintings’ — as relevant to the 
transformativeness analysis.”) (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
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ing on where a judge focuses interpretive authority, a case could result 
in a different outcome. The problem is that, at present, there is little 
consensus that sophisticated interpretation is necessary, let alone 
guidance on how interpretation can and should be done.76 Yet inter-
pretive grounds compete for authority. Choosing one interpretive 
method over another, as Judge Batts did in the Cariou litigation, does 
not occur in a vacuum of critical and legal theory, or at least it should 
not since those fields have already weighed the impact of making par-
ticular interpretive choices.77 
D.  The Analysis/Intuition Axis 
Judges in most copyright cases offer some amount of analysis of 
the works at issue. This may be as minimal as a brief summary or as 
extended as a discussion of tropes, characters, settings, or sources. 
Different circuits have developed habits of judicial analysis, and even 
formal tests for substantial similarity, that would seem to dictate the 
manner and necessity of conducting these so-called tests.78 All the 
tests are designed to sift the protected from the unprotected and con-
clude whether or not the works are substantially similar. The tests 
include (1) two-step copying and improper appropriation;79 
(2) extrinsic dissection/intrinsic judgment;80 (3) abstractions test;81 
(4) total concept and feel;82 and (5) abstraction, filtration, and compar-
ison.83 All tests, except for the concept and feel test, require courts to 
conduct analysis that creates a record of judicial discussion of textual 
evidence.84 
                                                                                                                  
76. See infra Part III.B (arguing that interpreting works for the purpose of copyright law 
is complex and requires sophisticated analysis). 
77. See Farley, supra note 12, at 839 (“[L]aw can often operate in a vacuum. The difficult 
questions . . . that courts encounter here have been addressed in philosophy, art history, and 
art criticism. But courts never acknowledge that these questions have already been theorized 
and that there are bodies of scholarship that are relevant and could be helpful.”). 
78. It is beyond the scope of the Article to discuss each of the tests and their merits; 
besides, Pamela Samuelson’s essay sets the tests out and describes their pros and cons, 
Samuelson, supra note 53, at 1823–40, and Mark Lemley’s essay describes the tests in the 
context of the general confusion across circuits, Lemley, supra note 40. 
79. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
80. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
81. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122–23 (2d Cir. 1930). 
82. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 1970). 
The phrase “total concept and feel” originates with Roth but is sometimes found elsewhere 
in the case law as the “overall look and feel” approach. Shyam Balganesh, Irina Manta & 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 274 (2015). 
83. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992). 
84. See Lemley, supra note 40, at 725. 
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1. The Analysis Approach 
When judges produce such analysis, they typically train their fo-
cus on the works and their similarities and differences, and they may 
discuss artistic choices that are evident in the works themselves. 
For example, in Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., Judge Kaplan of 
the Southern District of New York was called on to determine the 
nature of copyright protection of photographs,85 which in turn re-
quired his assessment of the amount of originality in plaintiff’s photo-
graph.86 In an action between a photographer, Jonathan Mannion, and 
an advertising agency representing Coors Brewing Co., Kaplan held 
that Mannion’s photograph was sufficiently original to warrant pro-
tection.87 Mannion had created a three-quarter-length portrait of Kevin 
Garnett, a basketball star, in the foreground and a cloudy sky in the 
background.88 Garnett wore a white t-shirt, white athletic pants, and 
bright jewelry.89 Defendants’ photograph featured a similarly posed 
young man, also muscular and African-American, wearing white 
clothing in front of a cloudy backdrop.90 Kaplan’s opinion offers a 
sophisticated and granular discussion of types of originality: originali-
ty in rendition (how a work is created),91 originality in timing,92 and 
originality in creation of the subject.93 While Kaplan ultimately turned 
to judicial intuition to analyze the photographs in question, his inter-
pretive methodology started with the author’s intention as a function 
of choices the works make manifest: 
Decisions about film, camera, and lens, for example, 
often bear on whether an image is original. But the 
fact that a photographer made such choices does not 
alone make the image original. “Sweat of the brow” 
is not the touchstone of copyright. Protection derives 
from the features of the work itself, not the effort 
that goes into it.94 
                                                                                                                  
85. 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
86. See id. at 454–55. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 447. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 448. 
91. Originality in rendition refers to how the work is created. See id. at 452 (“[C]opyright 
protects not what is depicted, but rather how it is depicted.”). 
92. Originality in timing refers to when a photographer is in the right place at the right 
time. Id. at 452–53. 
93. Originality in creation of the subject refers “to the extent that the photographer 
created ‘the scene or subject to be photographed.’” Id. at 453. 
94. Id. at 451 (footnote omitted). 
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Merely working hard, no matter how intense the effort, does not 
give rise to copyright in the final product.95 This is true in theory, at 
least, if not always in application. Judges are often at pains to distin-
guish choices that reflect so-called “sweat of the brow,” which copy-
right does not protect per se, from choices that are in fact creative 
decisions.96 Put another way, no matter how much an author intends a 
work to be original or works hard to make it so, the proof lies in the 
text, not in the intention or the effort. 
Despite the appeal of focusing on the works themselves, courts do 
not always engage in such analysis. This avoidance of analysis may 
have to do with a peculiar feature of copyright law. Bleistein v. Don-
aldson,97 an early photography case, contained dicta that has come to 
be known as the aesthetic non-discrimination principle: It stands for 
the idea that judges in copyright cases will refrain from “judicial art 
evaluation” to make determinations about what can be protected by 
copyright.98 Yet this principle has been understood more broadly — 
and perhaps improperly — to stand for the idea that aesthetics of any 
kind do not belong in copyright law.99 Judges may reasonably fear 
that discussion of certain issues connected with interpretive aesthetics 
will run afoul of Bleistein.100 Accordingly, at times judges offer rea-
sons or what appear to be intuition-fueled judgments precisely to 
avoid the kind of interpretive puzzles that this Article argues are in-
evitable in copyright litigation. 
2. Intuition in Copyright Law 
Intuitionism refers to the judicial tendency to rely on intuition ra-
ther than analysis, hunch rather than data. The term in this Article 
encompasses two related forms of intuitionist analysis: first, gestalt 
intuitionism; second, intuitionism about the ordinary observer stand-
ard. The gestalt, or holistic approach,101 holds that the whole may be 
greater than or different from the sum of the parts. Copyright’s total 
                                                                                                                  
95. See id. (citing Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
96. See id. (citing Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60 
(1991)). 
97. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
98. Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 
25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2001). 
99. Id. at 1. 
100. The aesthetic non-discrimination principle refers to the entrenched principle that 
judges in copyright cases should not evaluate works of art for their aesthetic merits in the 
course of adjudication. Bleistein’s nondiscrimination principle has been called “[o]ne of the 
more enduring observations in all of copyright.” Id. 
101. The term gestalt, or gestaltism, comes from “[t]he theory in psychology that the 
objects of mind come as complete forms or configurations which cannot be split into parts; 
e.g., a square is perceived as such rather than as four discrete lines.” Gestalt Definition 
368920, STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY available at Westlaw.  
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concept and feel approach, for instance, has operated to create a copy-
rightable whole out of uncopyrightable parts.102 The second intuition-
ist area for copyright interpretation lies in judicial speculation about 
the ordinary observer. In theory, the lay (or ordinary) observer func-
tions much like the reasonable person in tort law.103 In tort law, this is 
commonly a jury question informed by the commonplace experiences 
of twelve different people. In copyright law, by contrast, this determi-
nation is often little more than a judicial pronouncement of what one 
judge believes the ordinary person would take to be the work’s “aes-
thetic appeal.”104 This determination is little more than intuitionism. 
In a fundamental sense, judicial intuition is always at work in le-
gal analysis in the common law system. Usually though, intuition 
does not substitute for formal methods. A judge would be hard 
pressed to defend an intuitive reading of a statute against a textualist 
reading.105 Judges do not simply say: “this is what the statute seems to 
mean to me,” or “my gut tells me the Constitutional meaning of liber-
ty is . . . .” Doing so would be replacing canons of construction and 
other interpretive tools with hunches. Yet this sort of intuitionism op-
erates with frequency in copyright law. It does so both by design and 
by accident. It does so by design through legal standards that empow-
er judges to speak in the guise of the ordinary observer, and to make 
legal rulings based on the “total concept and feel” of the works at is-
sue. For example, in one case concerning the copyrightability of the 
jungle character Tarzan, the court issued a pronouncement of his cop-
yrightability with nothing more than intuition to support it.106 The 
court offered its own impressions of Tarzan’s copyrightability: “Tar-
zan is the ape-man. He is an individual closely in tune with his jungle 
environment, able to communicate with animals yet able to experi-
ence human emotion. He is athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle and 
strong. He is Tarzan.”107 
Thus, intuitionism in copyright cases casts a long shadow – 
through general judicial intuition and through the lay observer stand-
ard employed in copyright law. Under the “lay observer standard,” the 
trier of fact must determine whether the works in question would be 
                                                                                                                  
102. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). 
103. See Irina Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303 (2012). 
104. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 
1960) (“[T]he patterns in which these figures are distributed to make up the design as a 
whole are not identical. However, the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the 
disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the 
same.”) (emphasis added); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
105. The same would hold for a plain-meaning, structuralist, purposivist, originalist, or 
pluralist reading. 
106. See Zahr K. Said, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a Legal 
Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 769, 815 (2013). 
107. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 
aff’d, 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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found substantially similar by a “hypothetical” ordinary observer 
whose reasonably expected impressions are supposed to guide the 
judge.108 The lay observer standard receives fuller discussion below. 
Another area of intuitionist adjudication in copyright law is the 
“total concept and feel” test first announced in Roth Greeting Cards v. 
United Card Co.109 In Roth, the Ninth Circuit found the plaintiff’s 
cards to be copyrightable, which consisted of “common and ordinary 
English words and phrases which are not original with Roth and were 
in the public domain prior to the first use by plaintiff.”110 In so find-
ing, it reversed the lower court’s decision and held that the combina-
tion of uncopyrightable factors nonetheless created something 
copyrightable: 
It appears to us that in total concept and feel the 
cards of United are the same as the copyrighted cards 
of Roth . . . . [T]he characters depicted in the art 
work, the mood they portrayed, the combination of 
art work conveying a particular mood with a particu-
lar message, and the arrangement of the words on the 
greeting card are substantially the same as in Roth’s 
cards.111 
Roth’s analysis consists of examining the elements themselves to 
try to capture what their “total feel” conveys. It is an approach that 
downplays granular analysis and dissection into component parts, in 
favor of a holistic (or gestalt) approach. 
Since Roth, the total concept and feel test has become the most 
prominent approach to comparing works of fiction.112 However, the 
test raises numerous questions and, arguably, was not intended to be-
come a generalizable test beyond the facts of the specific case.113 
Which elements should be included in the enumeration of things to 
consider as part of the “feel”? Should unprotectable aspects, such as 
ideas, stock characters, or fonts, be filtered out before the impression-
istic assessment begins? How can such an approach — which Tushnet 
                                                                                                                  
108. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Of 
course, the ordinary observer does not actually decide the issue; the trier of fact determines 
the issue in light of the impressions reasonably expected to be made upon the hypothetical 
ordinary observer.”). 
109. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). 
110. Id. at 1109. 
111. Id. at 1110. 
112. Mitchell J. Rotbert, Total Concept and Feel: A Doctrine Running Amok, 45 MD. B.J. 
20, 24 (2012). 
113. Samuelson, supra note 53, at 1833 (“While the Roth majority certainly used the total 
concept phrase, it did not announce this as a test that should be widely used in infringement 
cases. The phrase was more an off-hand comment than a well-conceived way to think about 
nonliteral infringement.”). 
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refers to wryly as “a sort of magic by which unprotectable parts to-
gether become protected”114 — overcome the fact that unprotectable 
aspects do not, by themselves merit protection? Is the total concept 
and feel equivalent to what Feist called the creative selection and ar-
rangement of facts?115 How does this impressionistic assessment 
avoid being “highly subjective,”116 or an outright “abdication of anal-
ysis,” given that the standard seems to target a “wholly amorphous 
referent”?117 In Tufkenian Import, a case about competing Oriental 
rug designers, the court emphasized that the Roth test should be ap-
plied only after a court’s dissection into original and unprotectable 
parts.118 Tufkenian Import’s approach to Roth suggests that the “total 
concept and feel test” is but one of many possible interpretive ap-
proaches.119 
Unfortunately, though, many courts apply it less carefully, tend-
ing to treat it less as an approach and more as an internal element.120 
Judicial opinions may divide their analysis into discussion of similari-
ties between the works, and subheadings will indicate that the analysis 
treats plot, characters, settings, and total concept and feel all as equal-
ly situated and inevitable aspects of the works themselves.121 In other 
words, one interpretive method, which is merely a possible perspec-
tive on the work, gets internalized as an element of the work. This 
naturalizes the approach and makes it difficult for subsequent courts 
to adopt alternative approaches. Further, it makes the interpretive log-
ic effectively unassailable. As Tushnet has shown, under this test “the 
factfinder is directed to the gestalt, but a gestalt can’t be broken 
down.”122 Nonetheless, the gestalt approach often trumps other inter-
pretive methods and sources, as it arguably did in Roth, when plain-
tiffs’ claims would have otherwise failed to clear the copyrightability 
hurdle. 
                                                                                                                  
114. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 718. 
115. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). 
116. See Rotbert, supra note 112, at 25. 
117. See Tufkenian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 
(2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
118. Id. 
119. See id. at 134 (stating the court’s approach to the test “is not so incautious” as to 
abdicate analysis). 
120. See Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating the court must 
“examine the similarities in such aspects as the total concept and feel, theme, characters, 
plot, sequence, pace, and setting of the [works]”). 
121. See, e.g., Canal+ Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak, 773 F. Supp. 2d 419, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (listing total concept and feel among the elements courts examine in “assessing 
whether two works are similar”); Crane v. Poetic Prods. Ltd., 593 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 351 F. App’x 516 (2d Cir. 2009). 
122. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 719 (footnote omitted). 
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3. The Limits of Intuition 
Some courts have recognized the limitations of the total concept 
and feel test. Shaw v. Lindheim is a classic copyright case that took 
aim at intuitionism; its holding arguably hinges on a shift in interpre-
tive method.123 Lou Shaw was a successful television scriptwriter who 
argued that his program, The Equalizer, had been unlawfully copied 
by defendants’ pilot script for their television series Equalizer.124 De-
fendants conceded access to the work because Richard Lindheim, an 
executive at NBC, had reviewed Shaw’s script before NBC declined 
to purchase it.125 Thereafter, Lindheim left NBC and created his own 
series, conceding that he copied his title from Shaw’s script.126 Thus, 
the case hinged on whether the two works were substantially similar 
to support a finding of improper appropriation.127 The district court 
had held as a matter of law that the works in question were not sub-
stantially similar.128 Shaw appealed, arguing that a reasonable trier of 
fact could have found substantial similarity, and thus summary judg-
ment was improper.129 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, 
and the court reversed and remanded on this issue.130 
In Shaw, it appears that the Ninth Circuit favored a combination 
of formalist and reader-response approaches to interpret the works, 
whereas the lower court prioritized a gestalt approach to interpreta-
tion. The court trained its attention on its own prior, much-criticized 
substantial similarity analysis.131 Krofft had set out a bifurcated analy-
sis: Step 1 was confined to what it called the “extrinsic” analysis, or 
“dissection” of the works, that is, in this Article’s paradigm, formalist 
analysis.132 At this stage, a court, perhaps relying on expert guidance, 
could examine elements, such as subject matter and the setting for the 
subject, so as to determine similarity of ideas as a matter of law.133 
Step 2 consisted of an “intrinsic,” more intuitionist analysis by the 
trier of fact, based on the ordinary reasonable person’s perception of 
the works.134 This second phase focused on the expression of the 
work’s ideas, where analytic dissection and expert testimony are not 
appropriate.135 
                                                                                                                  
123. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990). 
124. Id. at 1355. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. See id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See id. at 1363–64. 
131. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
132. Id. at 1164. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
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Shaw seized upon the ways in which Krofft’s distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic analysis was flawed, especially Krofft’s rule 
that the two phases should correspond to similarity of ideas and ex-
pression, respectively.136 Instead of framing Steps 1 and 2 as, respec-
tively, (1) extrinsic/ideas and (2) intrinsic/expression, Shaw framed 
the bifurcation as (1) objective and (2) subjective, both geared toward 
analysis of expression.137 
Shaw sought to correct Krofft’s mistaken bifurcation, and to min-
imize the impact of the subjective, manipulable part of infringement 
analysis.138 Indeed, Shaw expressly criticized judicial discretion to 
substitute intuitionism in place of actual assessment by a jury or trier 
of fact: “a judicial determination under the intrinsic test is now virtu-
ally devoid of analysis, for the intrinsic test has become a mere sub-
jective judgment as to whether two literary works are or are not simi-
similar.”139 
This subjective judgment was improper because “at the summary 
judgment stage, the judge’s function is not [herself] to weigh the evi-
dence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether 
there is a genuine issue for trial.”140 Shaw thus rejected a gestalt, or 
intuitive approach, specifically lamenting its lack of meaningful anal-
ysis.141 For support of its own critique, Shaw cited to cases whose 
analyses were more conclusory pronouncements than thoughtful de-
liberations, allowing them to “reach[] a result under the intrinsic test 
in one paragraph.”142 Further, Shaw referred to an “absence of legal 
analysis” as “frustrat[ing] appellate review of the intrinsic test.”143 
In Shaw, a change in interpretive method could be said to consti-
tute the main holding on appeal, even though Shaw did not cast its 
decision explicitly in those terms.144 This discussion of Shaw illus-
trates different interpretive tests courts can employ: the use of intui-
tionism (by the lower court) and its critique and rejection in favor of a 
more text-based formalism (in the appellate court). These methods 
can affect the outcome of the case. Notwithstanding that defendants 
won again on remand when new facts came to light, Shaw could have 
come out differently on the original facts had the court applied a more 
analytical method. 
                                                                                                                  
136. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990). 
137. Id. 
138. See id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1359 (alteration in original) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 249 (1986)). 
141. See id. at 1357. 
142. See id. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. at 1363–64. 
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E. The Text/Context Axis 
This Section discusses the way different sources can serve as in-
terpretive grounds, requiring that judges make complex decisions 
about how to decide what counts as interpretable evidence. When they 
locate the grounds for their interpretive authority, judges variously 
prioritize: the text;145 the author’s intentions about it;146 the expert’s 
testimony about it;147 the lay observer’s or audience’s reception of the 
text;148 or the judge’s own intuitions or impressions of the work.149 In 
most copyright cases, judges emphasize the texts at issue and center 
their analysis there, sometimes even to the exclusion of contextual 
evidence. Though many factors external to the text might be relevant 
to interpretation under another approach, a formalist approach views 
the internal features as carrying dispositive weight. This approach 
parallels the “four-corners” approach to contracts in legal analysis.150 
In the context of patent law, Craig Nard has called such an approach 
“hypertextual.”151 Many classic copyright cases display some version 
of formalist analysis, and some are, to paraphrase Nard, hypertextual 
or exclusionary toward contextual evidence.152 
1. Focus on the Text 
In Walker v. Time Life Films, the author of the autobiographical 
police memoir Fort Apache sued the authors and producers of a 
screenplay entitled Fort Apache: The Bronx.153 The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of plain-
tiff’s motion, holding that no reasonable observer could have found 
the two works in question to be substantially similar beyond unpro-
tectable elements such as ideas.154 The court also held that it had not 
been error for the lower court to base its judgment on the judge’s own 
assessment of the works after having read the book and watched the 
                                                                                                                  
145. See, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57 (2d 
Cir. 2010); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 
784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986). 
146. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. 
Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
147. See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004); Newton v. Diamond, 349 
F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003); Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990); Tisi v. Patrick, 
97 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
148. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
149. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). 
150. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER ET AL., BASIC CONTRACT LAW: CONCISE EDITION 525–26 
(9th ed. 2013); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE 
L.J. 926, 957–63 (2010). 
151. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 
(2000). 
152. See id. 
153. 784 F.2d 44, 46 (1986). 
154. Id. 
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movie, even though it meant refusing to view some of the evidence 
plaintiff Walker had prepared and offered as proof of the works’ simi-
larities.155 
In the course of the lower court’s largely well-reasoned opinion, 
Judge Edelstein considered a number of interpretive theories. He be-
gan and ended with the text, stating: “In determining copyright in-
fringement, the works themselves supersede and control contrary 
allegations and conclusions, or descriptions of the works as contained 
in the pleadings.”156 He chose to locate his interpretive authority in 
the text, prioritizing the court’s own close reading of the text itself 
over “conclusions, or descriptions of the works,”157 such as critical 
readings and expert testimony. By excluding plaintiff Walker’s own 
analysis of the works’ similarities, Judge Edelstein also placed the text 
over the author’s intentions and statements about it.158 To be sure, the 
plaintiff is self-interested, and thus any statements offered up about 
the works may be presumed to be informed by litigation strategy as 
well as artistic intention. Nonetheless, Judge Edelstein’s emphasis on 
the text reflected a choice: The text, in a formalist approach, trans-
cends forces beyond or external to it in terms of its capacity to provide 
interpretive authority. 
The opinion’s analysis is thorough, attentively considering sever-
al elements, including genre.159 In its awareness of the importance of 
genre,160 the court gestured to something like an audience interest, 
which is external to the text. This is because works that operate within 
the same genre will likely contain many similarities: think of two 
cowboy westerns, two hardboiled detective stories, two movies about 
dinosaur theme parks, and so on. The similarities common to a genre 
require audience “decoding.”161 The presence of particular and usually 
uncopyrightable elements162 is what allows audiences to recognize 
certain genres as such. 
Still, the opinion is unmistakably formalist, or text-based, in its 
orientation. When Walker raised actual audience confusion as a plau-
sible way of determining similarity, Judge Edelstein rejected his ar-
gument.163 Walker pointed to three newspaper articles which 
                                                                                                                  
155. Id. at 52. 
156. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 784 
F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986). 
157. Id. 
158. See id. at 436–37. 
159. Id. at 437–39. 
160. See id. at 437. 
161. STEPHEN NEALE, GENRE (1980). 
162. Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 436 (“[I]ncidents, characters or settings which, as a practical 
matter, are indispensable or standard in the treatment of a given topic — are not 
protected.”). For instance, “[i]n any account based on experiences in a poverty stricken, 
crime-ridden environment, depictions of bribery, prostitution, purse-snatching and 
neighborhood hostility to law enforcers are inevitable.” Id. 
163. See id. at 437. 
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purported to confuse his and defendant’s works.164 These articles 
failed to persuade the court that the lay observer in general would 
have found the works substantially similar, because “a few opinions 
cannot enlarge the scope of statutory protection enjoyed by a copy-
righted property.”165 The text transcended the audience, at least on 
this scant evidence.166 
Walker’s formalist approach is also evident it its citation to Davis 
v. United Artists, a case involving a film and a novel both based on 
the Vietnam War.167 In Davis, the court granted defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment, and it excluded plaintiff’s literary expert’s 
opinion of the works’ similarity.168 The rationale for this exclusion 
was strongly formalist: The court’s own reading and viewing of the 
works gave it the clear ability to discern, on the basis of the works 
themselves, that there was no similarity.169 The court cloaked its deci-
sion-making in the language of audience reception, yet the audience 
was simply a construct imagined to share the same intuitions and 
analysis as the court.170 
Subsequent courts have relied heavily on Walker’s dicta, namely, 
that “the works themselves supersede and control contrary descrip-
tions of [the works].”171 Indeed, the Second Circuit’s reasoning in 
Walker emphasized this text-centered approach, downplaying simi-
larities that might have otherwise become apparent from expert analy-
sis.172 In Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp. 
(“Gaito II”), a case involving architectural plans, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed a grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, because substantial similarity can be de-
termined at that early stage as a matter of law.173 If no substantial sim-
ilarity exists between the works, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed 
for failure to state a claim.174 The standard for determining whether 
                                                                                                                  
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. The court does not rule here that actual audience confusion could never provide 
interpretive authority for the finding that the works are substantially similar; it merely rules 
that, in this case, there is too little evidence of audience confusion. 
167. 547 F. Supp. 722, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
168. Id. at 724–28. 
169. See id. at 725. 
170. Id. (The court observed that if it “had read plaintiff’s book and seen defendants’ 
motion picture, unaware of this infringement action, it never would have dawned upon it, as 
an average observer, that there was the slightest connection between the two works other 
than in the common title and the subject of the Vietnam War”). 
171. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1986). 
172. See id. at 51 (“[C]omparison of secondary or descriptive materials cannot prove 
substantial similarity under the copyright laws . . . because the works themselves, not 
descriptions or impressions of them, are the real test for claims of infringement.”). 
173. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp. (Gaito II), 602 F.3d 57, 59 
(2d Cir. 2010), aff’g 2009 WL 5865686 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009). 
174. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp. (Gaito I), No. 08 Civ. 
6056(WCC), 2009 WL 5865686, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009). 
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substantial similarity exists is “whether an average lay observer would 
recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the cop-
yrighted work.”175 On the basis of this language, one might expect the 
emphasis to be on the audience or the court’s understanding of the 
works. It is audience perception of the similarity that appears to be the 
standard for infringement. Instead, however, to determine whether 
copyright infringement existed, the Gaito I court quoted the Walker 
rule that works “supersede and control.”176 
In Gaito II, the question was whether a copyright infringement 
claim could be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which 
was then an issue of first impression in the Second Circuit.177 The 
case’s posture understandably steered the court’s discussion to the text 
as a source of interpretive authority since the crucial question was 
whether the texts and the parties’ pleadings, without more, could 
serve as a sufficient basis for a final disposition. Still, the case is 
noteworthy for doubling down on the autonomy of the text in resolv-
ing copyright disputes. Substantial similarity is typically considered 
an “extremely close question of fact,”178 requiring resolution by the 
trier of fact,179 and not usually recommended for resolution as a mat-
ter of law.180 However, substantial similarity can sometimes be deter-
mined as a matter of law, either because no reasonable jury could find 
that the two works are substantially similar or because the similarity 
concerns only uncopyrightable elements.181 
Gaito II reasoned that when a court considers substantial similari-
ty, “no discovery or fact-finding is typically necessary, because ‘what 
is required is only a visual comparison of the works.’”182 Drawing on 
Walker, the Gaito II court ruled that the text trumps other sources of 
interpretive authority — or at least, it can. The court’s language em-
phasizes formalism: “It is well settled that in ruling on [a motion to 
dismiss], a district court may consider ‘the facts as asserted within the 
four corners of the complaint’ together with ‘the documents attached 
to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the 
complaint by reference.’”183 
Because the works had been attached to the pleadings as docu-
ments for the court to review, the court was deemed to have all it 
needed for its ruling.184 Judge Katzmann concluded that “where, as 
                                                                                                                  
175. Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 
176. Gaito I, 2009 WL 5865686, at *5. 
177. See Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 59, 63. 
178. Id. at 63. 
179. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 918 (2d Cir. 1980). 
180. See Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 63. 
181. See id. 
182. Id. at 64 (citation omitted). 
183. Id. (citation omitted). 
184. See Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“Although substantial similarity analysis often presents questions of fact, where the court 
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here, the district court has before it all that is necessary to make a 
comparison of the works in question,” it is entirely proper for a court 
to decide a motion to dismiss on the basis of substantial similarity (or 
the lack thereof).185 According to this view, which subsequent case 
law has continued to adopt, the text possesses all the interpretive tools 
needed to unlock it, for the purposes of answering the questions copy-
right would ask of it.186 
In Gaito II, following Walker, Judge Katzmann effectively locat-
ed the court’s interpretive authority in the text, but clarified that in 
some cases it might not be proper to decide the question of non-
infringement without discovery.187 Implicit in his decision is the idea 
that some cases are too complex to be determined without assistance 
but that this was not such a case. He cited Computer Associates v. 
Altai as an example of when expert testimony might be necessary, 
because the “strictures of [the court’s] own lay perspective” might be 
too limiting to understand the issues at bar.188 
As the analysis above demonstrates, Gaito II adopted formalism 
by adhering to the works over and above any sources about or outside 
the work. In contrast to formalism, contextualism may start outside 
the work189 and may encompass many different interpretive methods, 
including an approach that relies heavily on authorial intention or 
statements about the author’s work.190 
2. Authors’ Statements 
For legal analysis, the distinction between the work’s four corners 
and the world beyond offers a helpful, bright-line division of evi-
                                                                                                                  
has before it ‘all that is necessary to make a comparison of the works in question,’ it may 
rule on ‘substantial similarity as a matter of law on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’”) 
(citing Gaito II). 
185. Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 65. 
186. See Klauber Bros., Inc. v. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc., 557 F. App’x. 77, 80 (2d Cir. 
2014).  
187. See Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 65. 
188. Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 65 (quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 
693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
189. Formalism starts and ends with the formal analysis of the work, whereas 
contextualism may use as a source for interpreting the work the historical era in which the 
work was produced; the unequal power dynamics the work reflects or entrenches; 
biographical analysis that shows how the author’s life parallels or diverges from the work; 
statements of authorial intention; the conditions of the work’s reception, including analysis 
of its audience(s); or the material conditions of the book’s publication and dissemination. 
190. These approaches are really all identifiable as critical theory, but they generally 
include historicism, Marxism, feminism, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, biographical 
criticism, critical bibliography, post-colonial theory, queer theory, and cultural studies, 
among others. JONATHAN CULLER, LITERARY THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 
(1997) at preface. Indeed, contextualist interpretive methods predominate in non-legal 
realms, where a backlash against formalism has occupied the humanities since the late 
1940s. FRANK LENTRICCHIA, AFTER THE NEW CRITICISM 305 (1983). 
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dence. When judges have before them the works at issue, they can, 
under one theory, simply adjudicate those with nothing beyond the 
parties’ pleadings.191 However, this formalist approach is not an inevi-
table way to proceed; alternatives do exist. For instance, a court could 
find that an author’s statements about his work, found outside the 
work itself, are relevant. A court did so in Blanch v. Koons, granting 
deference to Jeff Koons, the appropriation artist who had made unau-
thorized use of the image of a sandal shot by fashion photographer 
Andrea Blanch.192 In the court’s words, “we need not depend on our 
own poorly honed artistic sensibilities” when there is “no reason to 
question [Koons’s] statement that the use of an existing image ad-
vanced his artistic purposes.”193 In so finding, it downplayed other 
potential factors, such as formalist dissection, judicial intuition, and 
audience responses. 
Likewise, in Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin, the court chose a con-
textualist approach over other possible methods.194 The dispute con-
cerned an unauthorized sequel to Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the 
Wind.195 The trial court used a formalist interpretive lens in finding 
Alice Randall’s work, The Wind Done Gone, to be infringing and 
granted an injunction.196 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the 
preliminary injunction and held that Randall was likely to prevail on 
the question of fair use, largely because the circuit court shifted inter-
pretive gears from formalism to contextualism and seemed to recog-
nize in Randall’s efforts a larger social critique of slavery.197 Judge 
Birch’s opinion dealt with defendant’s work generously. He immedi-
ately characterized Randall’s defenses as “persuasive,” and cited her 
stated purpose favorably: “[Randall] persuasively claims that her nov-
el is a critique of GWTW’s depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era 
American South. To this end, she appropriated the characters, plot and 
major scenes from GWTW . . . .”198 Birch’s summary of her use as 
directed toward critique is, in some sense, a legal conclusion. To lead 
with this legal conclusion suggests an emphasis on the larger critical 
context in which it was written.199 Judge Birch acknowledged the dif-
ficult — and subjective — undertaking of finding fair use,200 but did 
not appear to do much to minimize his own subjective input. 
                                                                                                                  
191. See id. at 59. 
192. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006). 
193. Id. 
194. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 
2001), vacated, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
195. Id. 
196. See id. 
197. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001). 
198. Id. at 1259. 
199. See id. at 1270. 
200. See id. at 1273 (“[W]e must determine whether the use is fair. In doing so, we are 
reminded that literary relevance is a highly subjective analysis ill-suited for judicial inquiry. 
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Judge Marcus’s concurrence went further and added more robust 
contextualist analysis: “Like a political, thematic, and stylistic nega-
tive, The Wind Done Gone inverts Gone With the Wind’s portrait of 
race relations of the place and era.”201 Judge Marcus emphasized the 
way that The Wind Done Gone had positioned itself as an inversion of 
the prior work, which necessarily takes account of the way the book is 
intended to be received and its larger critical context. He called the 
case an easy one for fair use but stressed the relevance of the books’ 
“two literary worldviews of . . . perfect polarity,” and thus their in-
volvement in controversies outside the four-corners of the works 
themselves.202 
Given the concurrence of views between Judge Marcus and Judge 
Birch, who seem to differ mostly in degree, it is interesting to note 
their departure from Judge Pannell’s far more formalist opinion in the 
lower court. Judge Pannell offered more textual analysis, and he 
placed less reliance on the social critique of slavery; he wrote: 
This new vision [of defendant], however, does not 
simply comment on the antebellum South by giving 
the untold perspective of a mulatto slave who is sold 
from the plantation, develops a relationship with a 
caucasian [sic], lives well and travels the world. Ra-
ther, the new work tells Gone With the Wind’s story, 
using its characters, settings, and plot.203 
Judge Pannell’s formalist analysis was responsible for finding a like-
lihood for plaintiff to prevail on the merits, and an injunction is-
sued.204 Perhaps based on the sheer volume and quality of the amount 
copied,205 Pannell’s opinion found that Randall’s story “told” or, in 
some sense, stole Mitchell’s story using materials created by the lat-
ter. Thus, formalism stressed the works’ similarity; contextualism 
stressed the need for so much borrowing. The Eleventh Circuit opin-
ion shows that a contextualist approach that takes full consideration of 
the critical context, including the author’s statements about her pur-
pose — which seemed plausible in this case — can lead to a different 
outcome. 
                                                                                                                  
Thus we are presented with conflicting and opposing arguments relative to the amount taken 
and whether it was too much or a necessary amount.”). 
201. Id. at 1279–80 (Marcus, J., concurring). 
202. Id. at 1278. 
203. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 
2001), vacated, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
204. See id. at 1367–70. 
205. See id. at 1368 (“The court finds that The Wind Done Gone . . . is substantially 
similar to Gone With the Wind in both quantitative and qualitative terms.”). 
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3. Historical Context and Genre  
Another recent example illustrates what it looks like when a court 
deliberately situates its interpretive authority in a work’s context, dis-
cussing both genre and historical context. Because the same plaintiff 
came before the court multiple times with versions of the same work 
(albeit naming different defendants), the court’s various interpretive 
approaches can be discerned and meaningfully compared. In two ac-
tions based on the same screenplay, before two different judges, the 
court made different methodological choices, first grounding its au-
thority in the text and subsequently grounding it in context. 
In Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, the actress and author, Emma 
Thompson, sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement for her 
screenplay about the unhappy marriage of Euphemia (“Effie”) Gray 
and John Ruskin, and the subsequent marriage between Effie and the 
pre-Raphaelite painter, John Everett Millais.206 Ruskin and Millais 
were important figures from the arts and letters of the Victorian era.207 
Eve Pomerance had previously published two screenplays about these 
same figures, and when she threatened suit, Effie Film sued for de-
claratory relief on behalf of Thompson.208 In the course of granting 
Effie Film’s 12(c) motion, Judge Oetken of the Southern District of 
New York carefully summarized all three of the works at issue.209 In 
so doing, he grounded his authority in the texts at issue, adopting a 
formalist approach. 
In Effie Film, LLC v. Murphy, decided by a different judge on the 
same court the following year, Judge Griesa cited to Judge Oetken’s 
opinion in Pomerance approvingly.210 Gregory Murphy, an author of 
numerous plays and other literary works, had produced a play for the 
stage and a screenplay both entitled The Countess, that likewise fo-
cused on the Gray-Ruskin marriage, the Gray-Millais romance, and 
related historical events.211 In the stage of litigation that concerns us 
here, the court had before it Thompson’s complete, allegedly infring-
ing screenplay, and it could have proceeded directly to analyzing the 
two works. In so doing, it would have been using a formalist approach 
to copyright’s substantial similarity analysis, which is the means of 
                                                                                                                  
206. Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
207. See id. 
208. See id. 
209. See id. at 279–90. 
210. Effie Film, LLC v. Murphy, 932 F. Supp. 2d 538, 553 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 
564 F. App’x 631 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Judge Oetken has recently provided an excellent analysis 
of copyright law as it applies to works of historical fiction, and even the ‘Effie’ screenplay 
itself, in granting an analogous motion in another action brought by Effie Film against 
another author of a screenplay based on the same historical events.”). 
211. Id. at 542. 
No. 2] Reforming Copyright Interpretation 499 
 
determining whether prima facie infringement has occurred.212 A 
great deal of prior case law suggests that courts may grant motions 
even at early stages on the basis of nothing more than textual analysis 
of the works themselves, with no consideration of context, discovery, 
or expert testimony.213 Thus nothing, in theory, prevented the court 
from adopting a formalist approach, simply doing a close reading of 
the two works, and rendering judgment. Perhaps most importantly, 
this would have followed the interpretive approach the court itself had 
taken in the Pomerance litigation the year before. 
The Effie court did not do so. It made an interpretive choice to 
ground its analysis in what might be called a contextualist or histori-
cist reading of the works. Even more precisely, we might call it a 
hermeneutically historicist approach.214 Put in less florid terms, the 
court was simply contextualizing the works by trying to evoke the 
Victorian era, helpfully cataloguing characteristics likely to appear in 
any work about that epoch. It is striking that the first things the court 
said about the work are not directly about the work at all, but about 
the era in which the stories are set: 
Both ‘Effie’ and ‘The Countess’ present fictionalized 
accounts of the same historical events. Therefore it is 
necessary to review the historical episode that both 
works draw from . . . . [I]t will be impossible to 
gauge the creative similarities of the works without 
some grasp of the historical narrative.215 
The court stated that substantial similarity analysis was “impossi-
ble” without reference to a contextual framework. The court was thus 
suggesting that the task of comparing the works — the central task in 
any finding of copyright infringement — requires a historically in-
formed interpretation. 
                                                                                                                  
212. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp. (Gaito II), 602 F.3d 57, 
65 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]here . . . the district court has before it all that is necessary to make a 
comparison of the works in question, it may rule on substantial similarity as a matter of 
law . . . .”). 
213. See id. at 65–66; see also Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941–42 
(10th Cir. 2002); Christianson v. W. Publ’g Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945). 
214. I qualify my use of the term “historicist” because typically historicism refers to 
investigation into the era of a work’s production. The animating idea of historicism, or at 
least the new historicism, is that works cannot be understood except as artifacts reflecting 
the social ideas and environment, the “network of material practices,” of the time of their 
creation. H. Aram Veeser, Introduction, in THE NEW HISTORICISM ix, xi (H. Aram Veeser 
ed., 1989). Here instead the approach is informed by historical research, which allows the 
court to engage in analysis of copyright doctrines, such as scènes à faire and the 
idea/expression dichotomy. The court’s focus nonetheless draws on an approach Paul 
Hamilton has identified as hermeneutic historicism, in which “[t]he past is to be understood 
on the model of interpreting a text; and texts, literary or otherwise, only have meaning 
within an economy of other texts . . . .” PAUL HAMILTON, HISTORICISM 3 (2d ed. 1996). 
215. Effie, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 543. 
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Put another way: To read the text, the court said, one must look 
first outside the text. Remarkably, the court dedicated thirteen para-
graphs of its opinion to a summary of the historical moment and to 
biographical events that help set the stage for both Effie and The 
Countess.216 Yet in the earlier adjudication of this same plaintiff’s 
work, the other district court had adopted a different approach. While 
the earlier case, Pomerance, acknowledged that the issue of historical 
fiction presented particular issues, and mentioned the Victorian era in 
passing,217 it devoted the bulk and the emphasis of its opinion to for-
malism, offering summary and exegetic analysis of the works.218 
Pomerance dedicated thirteen paragraphs to the Effie script and fifteen 
and eleven to each of defendant Pomerance’s scripts respectively.219 
Consider by way of further contrast with Effie’s approach to his-
torical context, Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., a landmark, 
if oft-criticized, case about the copyrightability of nonfiction historical 
accounts.220 There, the works at issue both took place in Nazi Germa-
ny,221 no less complex and important an era than the one discussed in 
the Effie litigation. Even though discussion of the historical era de-
picted in both works was a doctrinally important part of its analysis,222 
Hoehling is hardly a model of historicist emphasis. Instead, Hoehling 
focuses on copyright’s subject matter limitations as a matter of sound 
public policy, sidestepping close analysis of the works after simply 
                                                                                                                  
216. See id. at 543–45. 
217. See Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
218. In its approach, Pomerance appears to follow the classic Learned Hand opinion, 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, providing what looks like a close reading and doing no 
more than acknowledging the historical era with a quick textual nod. Compare Pomerance, 
909 F. Supp. 2d at 278, with Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 49 (2d 
Cir. 1936). 
219. See Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 279–90. 
220. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); see Nash v. 
CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990) (criticizing Hoehling for failing to generate 
incentives efficiently); 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:63 (2014) (“Difficulties . . . have arisen 
in the area of history as the result of a poor first analysis . . . . Judge Hand’s comments 
reflect a naïve and blinkered understanding of how history is written . . . . [N]o narrative can 
be, as Hand suggested, a self-defining, self-selecting, self-ordering aggregation of 
facts . . . .”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the 
Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History after Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 
29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 647, 648 (1982) (“The Hoehling court’s approach is 
fundamentally flawed for at least five reasons.”). 
221. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 975. 
222. See id. at 979 (“[A]ll three works contain a scene in a German beer hall, in which 
the airship’s crew engages in revelry prior to the voyage[,] . . . common German greetings 
of the period, such as ‘Heil Hitler,’ or songs, such as the German National anthem. These 
elements, however, are merely scenes a faire . . . .”). 
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offering peremptory summaries.223 Hoehling chooses an interpretive 
methodology rooted in copyright instrumentalism.224 
The Effie court made a different choice by including thirteen par-
agraphs of historical background. As this historical background both 
preceded and, in some sense, preempted formalist analysis, the choice 
arguably determined the court’s disposition in finding no infringe-
ment.225 The court could have selected other interpretive methods, 
such as the “total concept and feel” test.226 Generally, this impression-
based judgment leads more easily to the conclusion of infringement 
when two works possess many similarities, even if the particular simi-
larities are historical facts and thus unprotectable in their own right.227 
The decision of the Effie court to ground its interpretive authority 
in a historicist reading, thus emphasizing or inflating historical context 
and downplaying text, reflects an important interpretive choice. To be 
sure a historicist or contextualist approach may be more appropriate in 
historical or biographical genres, where the copyright protection is 
already thin and the presence of common historical elements is more 
likely. After all, both works strive for fidelity to the same historical 
era, even if differently conceived. 
Judges can and do apply contextualist approaches to fiction too. 
In particular, when judges look at the question of genre they are ana-
lyzing the context in which the work may be understood. A hard-
boiled detective novel, for instance, looks extremely similar to another 
in its genre, until one considers that certain common tropes, plots, 
characters, and settings are likely to exist in both. Thus, part of the 
work of decoding a text is situating it in terms of its semiotic context, 
including its genre.228 Courts have recognized that, at times, a genre 
                                                                                                                  
223. Id. at 978 (“To avoid a chilling effect on authors who contemplate tackling an 
historical issue or event, broad latitude must be granted to subsequent authors who make use 
of historical subject matter, including theories or plots.”). 
224. See Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (“To achieve that end, Hoehling prioritizes 
an instrumental conception of copyright law and concludes that weak copyright protections 
will best facilitate the creation and dissemination of new historical knowledge.”). 
225. This is not to say that an historical or contextualist approach would always lead to a 
finding of non-infringement; at times the use of particular interpretive approaches reflects, 
as much as anything else, a commitment to judicial pragmatism, or perhaps a commitment 
to an outcome, where analysis is instrumentally serving that outcome. 
226. See supra Part II.D. 
227. See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 411 
(1989) (“If copyright claims can in fact be maintained at such a high level of abstraction, 
practically any similarity could conceivably support a finding of infringement.”); Lemley, 
supra, note 40, at 739. 
228. See Said, supra note 28, at 365 (“Typically, what texts demand of us, whether they 
are visual or verbal texts, is at least in part a function of genre. Texts, whether verbal or 
visual, are often virtually incomprehensible without reference to the generic tradition to 
which they belong, however uneasily.”). 
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makes demands on a work and limits authorial choices.229 Where that 
is true, similarity analysis must filter out the “elements dictated by 
efficiency, necessity, or external factors.”230 
In conclusion, nearly all copyright cases reflect clear interpretive 
choices. Some cases display a marked reliance on one interpretive 
modality; still others feature a mélange of methods. Many cases make 
no mention of interpretive methods as such, yet the method — and 
their evidentiary and decisional implications — can be discerned in 
most copyright cases. Examples from the case law demonstrate that, 
at present, courts shift between these interpretive gears, without ex-
plaining their choices even when those may be influential upon the 
case’s disposition. These cases illustrate that judges make affirmative 
choices about their own interpretive authority. These choices are not 
merely aesthetic;231 they are methodological choices that are legally 
relevant levers in litigation. Judges may choose to ground their inter-
pretive authority in a single source of authority, or they may discuss 
multiple authoritative grounds. Sometimes they offer no justifications 
for their finding,232 or they offer reasons without explaining their rela-
tive weight.233 
Loosely, one might say that judges most commonly choose analy-
sis over intuition and text over context, and some opinions will lean 
more heavily on one axis.234 In many cases, a mix of approaches ex-
ists. In rare cases, judges emphasize authorial intention. Finally, judg-
es, in their frequent reliance on the “total concept and feel” of a work, 
cast as an element of the work what is actually a method, intuitionism. 
It is important to distinguish between what is in the work from how to 
approach it, methodologically. Such distinctions can carry legal 
weight, and they arise to our attention only once it is acknowledged 
that copyright possesses many interpretive pressure points, featuring 
multiple interpretive choices. 
                                                                                                                  
229. See, e.g, Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 856 (6th Cir. 2003); Matthew Bender & 
Co. v. West Publ’n Co., 158 F.3d 674, 682 (2d Cir. 1998); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–08 (2d Cir. 1992). 
230. Trek Leasing, Inc. v. U.S., 66 Fed. Cl. 8, 16 (Fed. Cl. 2005). 
231. Pace Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). See supra 
Part II.D. 
232. For example, in substantial similarity analysis, as when the text is seen to speak for 
itself. See supra Part II.E. 
233. For instance, their reasons may track the fair use factors, but one factor may 
inexplicably trump the others, or reflect unclear and indeterminate analysis. Joseph Liu, 
Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 573 (2007) (“A significant problem 
with the current four-factor fair use test is its indeterminacy. Courts and commentators have 
long complained that the existing four-factor test provides scant guidance to those who 
would engage in fair uses.”). 
234. I qualify my assessments about the frequency of the use of particular approaches. 
These are not empirically tested claims. They simply reflect my opinion after reading, 
writing about, teaching, and rereading many copyright cases. 
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III. COPYRIGHT’S INTERPRETIVE CHOICE REGIME IS COMPLEX 
Interpretive issues in copyright are difficult and militate in favor 
of a doctrine that guides judges rather than assuming they already 
possess all the tools they might need for the task. Copyright law 
should recognize that analysis of copyrightable works is methodologi-
cally embedded in an intellectual history, both deep and wide, of so-
phisticated methods of interpretation in which judges already 
participate.  
A. All Copyrightable Works Are Complex 
Judges in copyright cases sometimes assume that nontechnical 
works in copyright cases are not complex and thus do not require 
methodologically explicit interpretation. This view is incorrect: Both 
the analysis and the works analyzed are complex, dynamic things and 
should be acknowledged as such. Judges have to make difficult meth-
odological decisions no less complex than those required of them 
when confronted with technical (software) cases. However, courts and 
scholars have not generally acknowledged the inevitable complexity 
in copyright cases, while they have done so in technical cases. 
Elsewhere in the law, when judges face complex or “polycentric” 
issues or issues that explicitly require interpretation, they offer rea-
sons and otherwise explain their work. Typically in such cases, judges 
receive expert evidence to guide their analysis. By contrast, in copy-
right law, when questions of interpretation grow very complex, judges 
sometimes offer conclusions with little to no support or explana-
tion.235 Judges sometimes proceed as though expressive works were 
effectively self-interpreting, facially clear, and thus semiotically ac-
cessible.236 Tushnet has referred to this as a judicial tendency to treat 
certain works as though they were “transparent,” that is, clear on their 
surfaces and thus requiring no interpretive apparatus.237 Displaying 
what Tushnet has aptly called, in the context of visual works, “the 
epistemic hubris” of copyright law, judges see fit to make rulings on 
artistic works as though these objects of study required no special 
methodology.238 That is, they can be said to treat expressive works as 
                                                                                                                  
235. See Farley, supra note 12, at 838–39 (“Probably the most prevalent way that courts 
deal with the tension . . . is simply to reach a conclusion on that question without including 
any supporting analysis . . . . The courts must have relied on certain ideas about the nature 
of art, but no reasoning was articulated.”). 
236. The view of texts as self-explicating or semiotically autonomous is discernible in 
judicial language stressing that artistic works themselves supersede any statements of them, 
as discussed supra with respect to dicta in Gaito II and Walker. See supra Part II.E. 
237. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 687. 
238. Id. at 721; see Folio Impressions Inc. v. Byers Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 
1991) (requiring only a visual comparison of the works). 
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if they were transparent (Tushnet’s language) or autonomous (this 
Article’s language). 
To be sure, this judicial tendency toward textual autonomy is effi-
cient, since it collapses the possibilities of the multiple into the certi-
tude of the singular.239 Yet this interpretive hubris also at times 
betrays an interpretive provincialism. Some judges seem to think that 
certain objects of their analysis are hard, and some are easier. Com-
puter Associates v. Altai, a case that has become a lynchpin in copy-
right’s infringement analysis, held that it was simply “the reality that 
computer programs are likely to be somewhat impenetrable by lay 
observers — whether they be judges or juries,” and it argued that it 
could not “disregard the highly complicated and technical subject 
matter at the heart of these claims.”240 Likewise this language, from a 
piece of scholarship published in a highly respected law review, cap-
tures the idea: 
Unfortunately, while judges are commonly familiar 
with literature, they are not necessarily familiar with 
the intricacies of computer technology. Judges have 
well-developed intuitions about what is and is not 
important in comparing two works of literature. One 
cannot hope for a similar understanding of computer 
programming, due to its more technical nature.241 
The patronizing tone here reflects the idea that “nontechnical,” 
expressive works are accessible to judges because of their training in 
(what in our era, in our country happens to be considered by many) 
the humanistic discipline of law.242 By contrast, judges are thought to 
lack the expertise to weigh in on complex software matters since legal 
training does not equip judges with familiarity in computer code lan-
guages.243 This presumption is not just a philistine nuisance; it has 
unfortunate ramifications for copyright law, as the next two subparts 
argue. 
                                                                                                                  
239. See Tushnet, supra note 22, at 688. 
240. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992). 
241. David W.T. Daniels, Learned Hand Never Played Nintendo: A Better Way To Think 
About the Non-Literal, Non-Visual Software Copyright Cases, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 635 
(1994). 
242. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Refining Notions of Idea and Expression Through 
Linguistic Analysis, in COPYRIGHT AND PIRACY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 204 
(Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2010) (“[C]ourts, who work daily with words, perhaps 
instinctively believe they understand the nature of literary works.”). 
243. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 713; Lee, supra note 16. 
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B. Analysis of Copyrightable Works Is Interpretively Complex 
At present, a consensus seems to exist that copyright adjudication 
does not require complex interpretive work of judges when they adju-
dicate expressive and artistic or “nontechnical” works.244 Copyright 
law contrasts expressive works with technical works such as software; 
the former are thought not to require particular training or sophistica-
tion for their adjudication. Both the works and the analysis necessary 
to adjudicate them are cast as nontechnical and thus accessible. Judges 
are thought to be able to decode the works at issue simply by having 
them in front of them; dicta refer to the way that texts offer a kind of 
testimony that judicial common sense can simply discern: “the ‘mute 
testimony’ of the forms put him in as good a position as the Copyright 
Office to decide the issue,”245 and “[g]ood eyes and common sense 
may be as useful as deep study of reported and unreported cases, 
which themselves are tied to highly particularized facts.”246 Some 
courts only allude to the purported simplicity of the work before them, 
while others say so outright: “[T]he Court recognizes that the task of 
comparing two fiction works is not highly technical, and indeed re-
quires no specific training . . . .”247 
In fact, however, the analysis of these works is methodologically 
complex. One court has bemoaned the “turbid water of the ‘extrinsic 
test’” and referred to its application in one context as a “somewhat 
unnatural task, guided by relatively little precedent.”248 When judges 
interpret an artistic text, they are necessarily making a set of 
unacknowledged methodological choices that presuppose anterior 
interpretive and theoretical judgments.249 
Experience or expertise surely increases the ability to make those 
judgments. Judge Richard Posner, also the author of a widely dissem-
inated book on law and literature acknowledges that, at least in one 
context of copyright law, judges must make judgments based on their 
interpretation of the works at issue.250 He argues that judges often 
must be able to grasp the point of a parody in order to find it non-
infringing.251 To that end, he thinks literariness a virtue, suggesting 
                                                                                                                  
244. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 713; Lemley supra note 40 (describing the state of the law). 
245. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(referring approvingly to Judge Wexler’s reasoning in the lower court’s decision). 
246. Klauber Bros., Inc. v. Russell-Newman, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 4985(PGG), 2013 WL 
1245456, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (referring to the lower court’s decision). 
247. Gable v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 815, 834 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 438 F. 
App’x 587 (9th Cir. 2011). 
248. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2004). 
249. See Zahr Said Stauffer, ‘Po-Mo Karaoke’ or Postcolonial Pastiche? What Fair Use 
Analysis Could Draw from Literary Criticism, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 43, 49–50 (2007). 
250. See RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 544 
(3d ed. 2010). 
251. See id. (“The more literary the judges, the greater the probability of finding [the] 
point” of the parody.). 
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that expertise helps what is otherwise a complex task.252 Many judges 
do not seem to view any particular expertise as necessary to the task 
of adjudicating copyright disputes over expressive, nontechnical 
works. 
Yet the complex task of adjudicating expressive works in copy-
right cases always requires some methodological choice. This is true 
even when judges speak from an analytical stance clothed in intuition, 
that is, a stance that appears to consist merely of common law-style 
legal reasoning. Professor Adrian Vermeule writes, “[t]he idea that 
judges should take each case as it comes, interpreting statutes sensibly 
in light of the materials at hand, itself constitutes an implicit choice of 
interpretive method and an implicit allocation of interpretive authori-
ty.”253 Intuitionism is a choice, as is the refusal to apply a particular 
method or to give reasons. These choices differ from conventional 
interpretive methods, but they should be viewed as methods judges 
sometimes choose. 
The interpretive choices attaching to expressive works are neces-
sarily complex, and how to negotiate these choices is by no means 
clear. The works themselves are also semiotically complex. Still, 
many courts proceed as though interpretive choices with respect to 
expressive works are unnecessary, and adjudicating cases concerning 
artistic works is easier than resolving questions raised by cases con-
cerning technology and science. The perceived lack of complexity 
means no robust methodology for how to analyze these works has 
emerged. Yet for matters of law, judges exercise a great deal of dis-
cretion — indeed they have nearly unfettered access to a range of in-
terpretive choices — and they usually decide, without external 
constraints, what interpretive sources they will select. Judges lack 
clear guidance on what to do when confronted with expressive or ar-
tistic works, because at present there is little awareness of the inter-
pretive complexity inherent in these works. 
C. Scholarly Awareness of Copyright’s Interpretive Complexity Is 
Growing 
Despite the prevailing view in case law that complexity tracks 
technicality, thus making nontechnical works presumptively non-
complex, recent scholarship has begun to explore copyright’s interpre-
tive complexity. Though this emerging body of scholarship has not 
emphasized interpretive method selection, it acknowledges assump-
tions about copyright’s inherent complexity in its attempts to locate 
heuristics to clarify copyright analysis. 
                                                                                                                  
252. Id. 
253. Vermeule, supra note 15, at 97. 
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In copyright law, the question of “originality as a legal construct” 
offers certain challenges in the contemporary creation landscape.254 
Professor Ed Lee has argued that originality, though historically a 
simple determination, may have grown more difficult to decide in the 
digital era.255 Nonetheless, judges at present do have what Lee charac-
terizes as “considerable discretion to decide the issue” of originality, 
and Lee laments that “the precise contours of [its] requirements re-
main obscure.”256 Professor Eva Subotnik has suggested that main-
taining a low threshold for copyright makes sense.257 This would seem 
to allow judges to do as little normative analysis as possible in an area 
fraught with aesthetic complexity. 
Both Subotnik and Lee propose certain heuristics to try to reduce 
uncertainty, the former as a three-part test, the latter as a set of prox-
ies. Subotnik writes, “[c]aught between the impermissibility of relying 
upon aesthetic virtues, on the one hand, and the degree of effort ex-
pended by an author, on the other, the closest courts can come to iden-
tifying originality, at least under the current copyright framework, is 
through proxies for the legal concept.”258 Subotnik’s suggested use of 
proxies underscores the complex work that judges do and the difficul-
ty they have had in articulating, let alone employing, interpretive 
methodology consistently. Likewise, Lee has proposed a heuristic 
designed to resolve problems arising from uncertainty around what 
authorship and originality mean in the digital era.259 Lee’s model 
would introduce authorial intent in combination with other factors, 
rather than focusing on only the text.260 In his emphasis on authorial 
efforts and skill, Lee acknowledges that independent creation will 
feature “a wide degree of subjective choices by the artist.”261 These 
choices seem likely to introduce issues of subtlety and complexity 
sufficient to make administering originality tests very difficult, absent 
clear guidance with respect to interpretation. It is striking, though, that 
both Subotnik and Lee seek to introduce legal strategies to guide 
judges, which is an indication of copyright’s inherent complexity. 
Relatedly, in the fixation context, scholars have noted the intricate 
theoretical questions judges must decide; difficulty is arguably aug-
mented by lack of clarity as a matter of interpretive method. For in-
stance, discussion of whether a work is “fixed” for the purposes of 
copyright’s fixation requirement requires selection of an interpretive 
                                                                                                                  
254. See Eva E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and 
Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1490 (2011). 
255. Edward Lee, Digital Originality, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 919 (2012). 
256. Id. at 920. 
257. Subotnik, supra note 254, at 1495. 
258. Id. at 1494. 
259. Lee, supra note 255, at 936. 
260. See id. at 937. 
261. Id. at 940. 
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method with which to proceed. Interpretive methods could vary in 
how to define the work, including how to conceptualize what counts 
as its “text” versus its context. For example, if the context around a 
work affects the work, does it erode the boundaries of the work? Put 
another way, once the text and context have been defined, what effect 
should context have on text, in a court’s definition of a work’s fixa-
tion? A court asked an intriguing version of this question recently: If a 
horticultural sculpture is eroded by wind and rain, does it change so 
much that it can no longer be considered fixed?262 Or perhaps a gar-
den lies at the other end of the spectrum — it changes too much by its 
very nature to be considered properly fixed in the first place: 
“[G]ardens are planted and cultivated, not authored. A garden’s con-
stituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed.”263 
Kelley’s fixation question tees up the difficulty of defining a work for 
the purposes of copyright law. 
How one frames what counts as “the work” in the first place is 
largely a function of interpretive method selection.264 Robert Rotstein 
has shown how bringing aesthetic theories to copyright law reveals a 
disconnect between the legal notion of a work as fixed and immuta-
ble, and the literary notion of a text as inherently mutable.265 Unlike 
the stable and autonomous “work,” which the law treats as akin to an 
object, the text is a process — an act of speech that occurs when a 
member of an audience (a reader, viewer, listener, computer operator) 
interacts with the textual artifact (that is, the book, motion picture, 
song, or computer program). Thus, for example, the song The Boxer 
in 1969 was a different “text” from The Boxer in 1981, because the 
listeners in each case “created” different texts.266 Rotstein’s view of 
the text as functionally dependent on its reader may overstate the crit-
ical influence of reception theory. Whether or not that view is accu-
rate, it highlights the normative nature of defining the boundaries and 
function of a work of authorship for the purposes of copyright law. 
Similarly, Professor Michael Madison has examined the con-
structedness of the notion of the work and urged scholars to treat the 
boundaries of a work with greater fluidity.267 Professor Laura Hey-
mann has drawn attention to the way that fixation delineates a legally 
constructed line around a work, and she stresses the fact that its 
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boundaries are not otherwise aesthetically fixed or inevitable.268 For 
Heymann, fixation is what “creates both an author and a commodifia-
ble subject, neither of which exists as a legal entity in copyright law 
before the act of fixation occurs.”269 Her analysis sheds nuanced light 
on the complex boundary that fixation creates: 
It transforms the creative process (and its subject) 
from a contextual, dynamic entity into an acontextu-
al, static one, rendering the subject archived, search-
able, and subject to further appropriation. Even in 
contexts in which there is no competing claim as to 
control, fixation still works to bound the fruits of 
creative effort, engendering distance between the au-
thor and audience. Fixation thus causes a kind of 
death in creativity even as it births new legal rights. 
Once an “author” has fixed a certain version of her 
work, she has propertized its subject, subordinating 
the work to the various laws and tropes that come 
with a property-based regime such as copyright law: 
ownership, transformation, borrowing, and theft. 
Fixation is what allows the subject to be commercial-
ized and analyzed; it is what marks the transfor-
mation to subject in the first place.270 
In Heymann’s vision, the dynamism of interpretive fluidity yields 
to static lines the law draws in order to demarcate — and contain — 
property. Heymann’s account of the “work” hints at the semiotic play 
between the various interpretive grounds in which authority can lie. If 
a judge grounds interpretive authority in the text (in Kelley, it was the 
horticultural sculpture), then changes like those made by the wind, the 
rain, and the fauna in Kelley would dictate a finding of non-fixation, 
and thus uncopyrightability. If a judge focuses on the work as some-
thing that exists in perpetual dialogue with its audience, thus embrac-
ing a reader-response theory, or a contextualist approach, a work’s 
contours will seem less defined. Viewed with such a lens, the work 
will evolve as perceptions of it evolve. Consequently, it would likely 
be held to be unfixed by its nature, like the garden in Kelley, unless an 
argument could be made that the work required flux and growth as 
part of its reception, without losing copyright protection altogether. 
Interestingly, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s estate attempted to make a 
version of this argument in order to extend copyright in Sherlock 
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Holmes, but the court rejected this line of reasoning as an end-run 
around the limited duration requirement.271 This brief discussion of 
the “work” as a legal construct shows yet another way in which inter-
pretive methods can make a legally relevant difference by invalidating 
for lack of fixation a copyright that otherwise appears valid. 
Recent scholarship attests to copyright’s inherent interpretive 
complexity. Scholars have responded by proposing heuristics and try-
ing to accurately diagnose when and where these difficulties arise. 
Scholars’ view of copyright law, however, does not align with the 
judicial presumption, alive and well in most circuits, that copyright 
law in nontechnical works is not interpretively complex and does not 
require special treatment or judicial guidance. 
D. Judges Receive Little Guidance and Have Much Discretion 
Conceiving of expressive works — and the analysis they re-
quire — as non-complex has two further consequences for copyright 
law. First, expert testimony tends to be disallowed on questions that 
are nonetheless difficult and could benefit from illumination by ex-
perts. Second, copyright imposes no requirement that judges be trans-
parent about how they decide where to ground their interpretive 
authority and how much weight to accord any one source.272 Because 
the question is not considered difficult at present, its resolution re-
quires no scrutiny and imposes no constraints. We might shrug and 
conclude that this flexibility is a characteristic aspect and one of the 
chief benefits of the common law system. Yet elsewhere in copy-
right’s analysis, judges do face some procedural constraints, and it is 
unclear that the scope of interpretive latitude exists by design, rather 
than because judicial interpretation has escaped our collective fo-
cus.273 Indeed, the proper scope of judicial discretion in choosing 
how, when, and even whether to interpret the works in copyright cases 
can be evaluated only once it is clear that copyright law routinely re-
quires that judges face these choices and that these choices are com-
plex. 
Indeed, a robust literature exists outside of copyright law that puts 
copyright’s interpretive regime into helpful perspective. In other areas 
of law similar questions have long been considered because of their 
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importance for doctrine and outcomes alike. Professor Kent 
Greenawalt has enumerated “dimensions of inquiry” arising in inter-
preting wills and contracts.274 He frames a list of binarisms to help 
determine how meaning should be derived from the text: Writer or 
reader? Subjective or objective? Abstract or contextual? Specific aim 
or general objective? Document or external evidence? Time of writing 
or time of interpretation?275 Those questions already arise in copyright 
cases, and judges are often pressed to answer them in some form, with 
little guidance. Judges in copyright cases make interpretive selections 
with little to no discussion of their choices being embedded in a larger 
critical conversation on interpretive theory, in both law and aesthetics. 
Partly because the interpretive decision-making process lies below the 
surface it remains malleable and produces inconsistent results. At pre-
sent, judges may rely on whatever interpretive methods seem to them 
to be warranted, without explaining why. Even within the focus on 
one of these sources, the analysis is not consistent or coherent across 
courts. With respect to the focus on audience, for instance, the judicial 
analysis appears circuit dependent and seems to consist of a hybrid of 
standards.276 Demonstrably, though, judges choose to prioritize one 
method of interpretation over another, without saying that — or 
why — they are doing so, thus creating a confused and confusing 
body of law.277 
These interpretive tensions exist in aesthetics as well. Rita Felski, 
a contemporary literary critic, has written: “We inflate context, in 
short, in order to deflate text; while newly magnified social conditions 
dispose and determine, the artwork flickers and grows dim.”278 Fel-
ski’s almost plaintive tone is in some sense trying to capture the diffi-
cult analytic balance between a text’s clearly internal factors and its 
external ones.279 Her comment evokes a longstanding set of debates 
over grounds of interpretive authority in schools of aesthetic and criti-
cal thought. These debates suggest that in the competition for interpre-
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tive authority, internal and external sources compete. When the so-
called “death of the author” occurs, thus lifting the reader to semiotic 
prominence, Roland Barthes writes, “the birth of the reader must be 
requited by the death of the Author.”280 The different approaches tak-
en by the two courts in Cariou reflect this potentially deep methodo-
logical divide,281 one to which scholars of aesthetics and humanities 
are highly sensitized, since the politics of interpretation occupy center 
stage in those fields of inquiry. Of course, interpretive choices about 
method also matter a great deal to legal outcomes. Because these 
choices matter, it is worth underscoring that they are difficult to make, 
full of semiotic, legal, and factual complexity. 
Despite this significant complexity, as it now stands, most circuits 
do not allow judges to receive a great deal of assistance from experts 
on what are arguably the hardest interpretive questions.282 This may 
be a consequence of the enduring fallacy that artistic works are not 
deserving of, or rather, do not require technical interpretation in the 
way that technical works, such as computer software programs, do.283 
Even when it is allowed, expert evidence plays a much more minor 
role in copyright law than it could play.284 Indeed, judges routinely 
deny or seem to ignore interpretive assistance when it is proffered.285 
Recognizing the genuine challenges of copyright’s interpretive com-
plexity could affect when and whether to admit expert testimony to 
assist fact-finders. 
At common law, the standard for infringement was whether an 
ordinary observer would recognize a work as having been impermis-
sibly copied by another.286 Altai held that expert testimony could be 
admitted in the narrow cases of complex works that might be too dif-
ficult for lay observers to understand.287 Altai thus reaffirmed “the 
traditional role of lay observers in judging substantial similarity in 
copyright cases that involve the aesthetic arts, such as music, visual 
works or literature.”288 Similarly, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow held 
that the ordinary observer test should not be applied in “cases involv-
ing exceptionally difficult materials,” because cases involving soft-
ware infringement might possess “complexity and unfamiliarity to 
most members of the public.”289 
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Technical subject matter commonly merits expert testimony, yet 
courts continue to hold that the aesthetic arts need no expertise be-
yond that of the lay observer — a standard applied by the factfinder, 
very often the judge.290 The admissibility of expert testimony is sub-
ject to court discretion under the federal rules of evidence, guided by 
the premise that the testimony “will help the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”291 However, with regard 
to nontechnical works courts have found expert testimony unneces-
sary.292 
Much subsequent case law has reaffirmed this distinction between 
technical and accessible, unfamiliar and familiar, scientific and artis-
tic, hard and easy, subject matter. Important legal consequences flow 
from this simplistic set of distinctions, which are, perhaps, reflected in 
the entrenchment of the terms “soft intellectual property” (referring to 
copyright, trademark, trade secret, and trade dress law), and “hard 
intellectual property” (referring to patent law).293 In a majority of cir-
cuits, judges are permitted to consider expert testimony in cases with 
technical issues, even when such testimony would be excluded in cas-
es with nontechnical issues.294 
Most circuits do not allow expert analysis on the question of 
whether copying was improper.295 Not all copying is unlawful, yet 
discerning what has been copied — and why — can be an extraordi-
narily difficult exercise in line drawing. It may seem counterintuitive, 
then, that the majority of courts exclude expert testimony during the 
stage of the analysis when analysis seems to grow most complex.296 
Even when, in theory, courts could admit expert testimony, judges 
frequently view such evidence with wariness. An early example 
comes from Judge Learned Hand, who refused to consider expert tes-
timony as to substantial similarity in the classic case of Nichols v. 
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Universal.297 As a methodological manifesto in the making, it is worth 
quoting in full: 
We cannot approve the length of the record, which 
was due chiefly to the use of expert witnesses. Ar-
gument is argument whether in the box or at the bar, 
and its proper place is the last. The testimony of an 
expert upon such issues, especially his cross-
examination, greatly extends the trial and contributes 
nothing which cannot be better heard after the evi-
dence is all submitted. It ought not to be allowed at 
all; and while its admission is not a ground for rever-
sal, it cumbers the case and tends to confusion, for 
the more the court is led into the intricacies of dra-
matic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to stand upon 
the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered 
impressions upon its own perusal. We hope that in 
this class of cases such evidence may in the future be 
entirely excluded, and the case confined to the actual 
issues; that is, whether the copyrighted work was 
original, and whether the defendant copied it, so far 
as the supposed infringement is identical.298 
Though in the case of Nichols, factors particular to the litigation 
may have disinclined Judge Learned Hand from taking expert evi-
dence seriously, many subsequent cases have evinced this similarly 
bristling attitude towards it. Even those judges who seem not to object 
to expert opinions scarcely welcome them. In Tisi v. Patrick, for in-
stance, the court viewed the expert opinion as little more than window 
dressing to judicial intuition: 
This action requires an analysis of the common and 
unique aspects of the two rock music compositions at 
issue . . . . Thanks to the skill of counsel and the clar-
ity of the Defendants’ expert witness, the unfamiliar-
ity of the court with the genre has been overcome. A 
combination of common sense and a hastily trained 
ear dictate the forthcoming result.299 
To be sure, the expert witness assisted, but the outcome relied on ju-
dicial “common sense” as much as anything else. 
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In sum, because judges do not acknowledge that they are making 
choices about their interpretive methodologies, their opinions can — 
and often do — reflect interpretive judgments that appear to be driven 
more by outcome than consistency, coherence, or expert guidance. 
That is, on a crucial underlying aspect of copyright adjudication, 
judges frequently move the goalposts in ways that frustrate the goals 
of predictability, fairness, and accountability in litigation. 
Copyright law should abandon its non-complexity premise, with 
respect to the work it requires of judges and the interpretively com-
plex nature of expressive works. The consequences of assuming non-
complexity are that expert guidance is disallowed right when it is 
most needed, and judges are not attentive to their interpretive method-
ology with expressive works because none appears necessary. The 
interpretive complexity inherent in copyrightable works supports the 
conclusion that copyright adjudication would benefit from greater 
transparency and more judicial guidance with respect to choice of 
interpretive methods. Acknowledging complexity underscores the 
benefit of an approach that emphasizes judicial analysis and down-
plays intuition, except in cases when intuition is acknowledged as its 
own method of interpretation. 
IV. DOCTRINE SHOULD STRUCTURE JUDGES’ INTERPRETIVE 
CHOICES 
Doctrine should play a bigger role in shaping, perhaps constrain-
ing, judicial decisions regarding interpretation in copyright cases. 
Copyright’s interpretive choice regime reflects its doctrinal complexi-
ty, and these choices matter to outcomes. Interpretive choices can 
control questions of major importance for the parties, such as whether 
an issue may be decided at summary judgment, whether expert testi-
mony is allowed or required, and whether a use is fair (among multi-
ple other doctrinal issues). Characterizing what copyright demands of 
judges helps clarify the proper scope of their authority and the proper 
tools for them to use in exercising it. Currently, the lack of structure 
that characterizes copyright’s interpretive practices creates unpredict-
ability and unfairness for the parties. Ultimately, the approach likely 
to produce the greatest predictability and fairness is one that incentiv-
izes judges to produce analysis-structured reasoning rather than intui-
tion-based judgments and that constrains judicial discretion over 
interpretive choice by defaulting to a focus on the text and the context 
only when necessary. This approach effectively relies on doctrine to 
structure judicial choices more consistently. 
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A. Interpretive Choice Belongs with the Judge 
One of the chief benefits of recharacterizing judicial practices in 
copyright as interpretively complex, as Part III has done, is being able 
to address the allocation of decisional authority more precisely. Judg-
es in copyright cases are called on to make complex interpretive 
choices about how to read a given work. While judges may not need a 
hearing simply on the interpretive issues in a copyright case, it is not 
unreasonable to think they might, in some cases, benefit from expert 
testimony or from extrinsic evidence that goes beyond the four cor-
ners of the work. The discretion to decide should be, however, not a 
doctrinal rule — as it is in copyright now, existing in an incoherent 
patchwork of different circuits’ rules — but a matter for judicial deci-
sion-making. Copyright judges should continue to exercise their au-
thority to make interpretive choices about the works they adjudicate, 
and they should do so largely as a matter of law, with exceptions dis-
cussed below. This is important because judges may choose from 
many different interpretive methods and could be encouraged to do 
so, so long as their reasoning remains transparent and is thoroughly 
explained. Keeping key interpretive questions with the judge and em-
phasizing analysis over intuition, and text over context, could allow 
courts to dispose of more cases through early stage motions, without 
the need for a fuller record or a full trial. In turn, this would have the 
salutary effect of minimizing the need for jury trials and, perhaps, 
shorten the timeline of copyright litigation generally. 
B. Judges Should Rely on Texts as a Default 
Our current regime provides judicial discretion over interpretive 
choice, with no mandate for transparency about the methodological 
choices that exist and that judges select. Greater constraints on this 
discretionary power make a good deal of sense if the goal is to make 
copyright law more consistent and predictable. In a two-tiered struc-
ture, judges deciding issues as a matter of law could default to the text 
as a source of interpretive authority, but proceed to other interpretive 
grounds, if such a departure is warranted. This would create greater 
predictability in outcomes and could minimize litigation time and ex-
pense. 
Text-based interpretation is well-suited to analysis by a single in-
dividual with the ability to “read” evidence like the patterns created 
through dissection or other “objective” analysis. While not every 
reader will draw the same conclusions from a set of similarities, the 
similarities are often inarguably present or absent. That is, parties can 
point to a list of similarities that is either more or less convincing, but 
No. 2] Reforming Copyright Interpretation 517 
 
that amounts to external, objective evidence.300 When parties offer a 
battle of the lists of similar features, judges can evaluate the strength 
of these lists against a baseline of their own extrinsic analysis of the 
works. Apples can be compared to apples and oranges discerned more 
readily as a different fruit. This extrinsic or objective analysis takes as 
its starting point the figurative “four corners” of the work, or what we 
might call the bounds of the work when it is not textual or paginated.  
The work serves as the source of interpretive authority, thus minimiz-
ing the amount of evidence required at that stage and narrowing the 
grounds available for dispute. Even if judges adopt an approach on the 
Analysis/Intuition axis that favors intuition, as long as they are fo-
cused on the text alone, the playing field is clear from the beginning, 
and the boundaries of the judgment are thus somewhat clearer than 
they would be under an approach that treated text and context with 
equal discretion. 
However, under this Article’s proposed approach, judges are ad-
vised to choose analysis over intuition. There are many virtues to ac-
knowledging that intuition plays a part in copyright law at present, 
from the “total concept and feel” test and the lay observer standard to 
instances in which judges make pronouncements on doctrinal matters 
without referring to anything more than their own intuition. Yet there 
are more virtues still to minimizing its role as much as possible going 
forward. For one thing, the confusion surrounding the “total concept 
and feel” test has converted it into an element that judges consider, 
when in fact it makes little sense to refer to the holistic aspects of a 
work’s impression in terms that put that perception of the whole on 
par with the individual elements such as plot, characters, and setting, 
which are indisputably part of the work. For another thing, what one 
judge finds intuitive may differ considerably from what another finds 
intuitive; it is axiomatic that an intuitive understanding may and often 
does diverge from descriptive and normative understanding. Finally, 
when a judge relies on intuition alone, it is difficult for subsequent 
courts to reconsider the issue on appeal. 
Consequently, this Article calls for text-based formalism. Formal-
ism, in general, is rule-based, rather than standards-based301 and seeks 
to minimize flexibility and maximize predictability.302 No interpretive 
method guarantees perfect predictability, of course. However, a meth-
od, such as text-based formalism, that emphasizes the same starting 
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point each time — the work or text at issue — and the same modes of 
procedure within that work, will create greater consistency across cas-
es. Judges can use formalism to weed out non-meritorious cases, or 
cases that are perhaps easy ones, lacking questions of fact about con-
text, intention, and other complicating factors. Simply producing a 
“close reading” of both texts will often suffice to resolve the question. 
Explicitly acknowledging that they are applying a formalist or four-
corners type of lens will curtail the fallacy that the work “speaks for 
itself,” which has in the past operated as a trump card to exclude other 
interpretive approaches, and extrinsic evidence.303 Texts are not self-
interpreting but require interpretive engagement of judges. Formalism 
brings judicial analysis to the surface, forcing judges to produce a 
record of analysis that is more objective than a hunch about the works 
in question. 
The formalism that would best serve copyright by producing the 
greatest predictability is a text-based formalism that emphasizes pro-
cedure, consistent reason giving, and process- rather than outcome-
driven reasoning. To the extent that this text-based formalism creates 
a mandate that judges “give reasons,” it creates commitments for the 
future, thus imposing a new set of constraints. If predictability and 
consistency are two of the key goals to keep in mind for improving 
copyright’s infringement analysis, a shift to text-based formalism will 
work best. 
Formalism is not, however, without drawbacks. The cost of using 
rules rather than standards is often loss of tailoring, and it can some-
times create unfairness.304 If judges explicitly adopt formalism in their 
resolution of questions of law, they will need some fallback or next-
level mechanism for what happens when formalism does not suffi-
ciently resolve the questions at bar. However, the need to move past 
formalism can be anticipated based on the types of work at issue and 
the specific facts in play. If parties believe a formalist approach will 
miss crucial elements of the litigation, they can brief the court accord-
ingly and signal to the judge that the case is one that should not be 
resolved as a matter of law, nor on a solely formalist basis. For in-
stance, they may point to expert depositions or even prior scholarship 
to indicate that expert opinions should be central to disposition of a 
case, or they may flag complex questions of fact that make pre-trial 
disposition improper. Where formalism appears inadequate, say, in 
cases requiring additional context or resolution of factual disputes, a 
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fuller trial is, in any event, appropriate, as the rules around summary 
judgment already reflect.305 
Text-based formalism’s virtues, if deployed in the way this Arti-
cle envisions, include offering defendants a more predictable and 
streamlined way to cut off litigation pre-trial because of a rebuttable 
presumption that judges, as a matter of law, could properly resolve a 
matter on the basis of objective or extrinsic analysis alone. Resolving 
disputes earlier on will help minimize costs to the parties and take 
pressure off the judicial docket by obviating the need for trial or for 
additional evidence on summary judgment motions. Additionally, 
explicitly relying on formalism will improve predictability and trans-
parency: Parties can anticipate that judicial focus will be on the works 
themselves and on analysis of their structures, themes, and concrete 
elements, rather than on a malleable, unpredictable impression of the 
works. The shift to a more objective standard of analysis makes sense 
in light of the increased reliance on summary judgment as a dispute 
resolution mechanism.306 Historically, courts withheld summary 
judgment in copyright cases because of the concern that judges would 
have to wade into subjective analysis of similarity.307 Though it is 
now well-settled that courts may find non-infringement as a matter of 
law on a motion of summary judgment,308 such determinations are 
limited to cases in which only uncopyrightable elements have been 
copied or because the two works at issue are objectively not substan-
tially similar: No reasonable juror could find otherwise.309 For all the 
foregoing reasons, when interpreting works at stages in which issues 
exist as questions of law judges should default to formalism as a clear, 
predictable, rule-based interpretive method, whose analysis has the 
greatest capacity to be objective, efficient, and transparent. 
C. Text-Based Formalism by Itself May Not Suffice 
In certain cases, however, text-based formalism will not be the in-
terpretive method best suited to achieve predictability, transparency, 
and fairness. Specifically, when questions of fact arise, formalism 
ceases to be the ideal default interpretive method. This is because 
some doctrines will require fact-finding (on questions of access and 
copying, for instance) or call for extensive inquiry into potentially 
subjective questions (such as an author’s intent, the meaning of an 
unclear scope of assignment of copyright, or an audience’s reception 
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of a work). Certain doctrines may, in fact, require particular lenses, 
and in those cases contextualism may be more procedurally burden-
some but fairer than formalism. Thus, there are many doctrines in 
which text-based formalism alone may not render a fair or thoroughly 
reasoned decision. 
For instance, when judges consider issues of joint authorship, 
works made for hire, and transfers and assignments of copyright, they 
are very likely to encounter uncertainties that go beyond the four cor-
ners of the given works. Disputes may touch on the works’ similari-
ties, and to that extent an explicitly formalist lens still makes sense on 
those issues. But the broader range of issues implicated will include 
authorial intention, employment conditions, contracts, targeted audi-
ence, and so on. Judges adjudicating questions not amenable to text-
based formalist approaches may consider intentionalism, institutional-
ism, contextualism, or some mix of those approaches.310 
An interesting test case lies in interpretive methods used to de-
termine fair use. The range of possible fair use cases is great, and 
some uses are much more clearly fair than others.311 In some cases, 
the strong speech interests involved in fair use litigation would sup-
port a robust formalist approach that allows a judge to determine 
whether a use was fair on the basis of his or her objective analysis of 
the works alone. Such a clear, rule-based approach to the doctrine 
would help defendants with stronger constitutional interests, for ex-
ample, because their use is for news reporting or is clearly non-
commercial.312 Yet the backdrop of fair use cases shows that, in many 
of them, formalism could prove to be a poor fit because fair use often 
requires discovery and resolution of mixed questions of law and 
fact.313 The nature and purpose of the use, which drives the first prong 
of fair use analysis,314 is sometimes not readily visible under a formal-
ist approach. Sometimes it reveals itself under contextualist analysis 
(looking at genre or audience reception by a particular interpretive 
community to which the judge is not privy); sometimes it can be in-
formed by statements of authorial intention, expert opinions, or great-
er information, generally, all of which lie outside the text.315 Indeed, 
fair use is often considered a question of mixed fact and law and his-
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torically tended to be almost exclusively the province of the fact-
finder.316 Quite plainly, the statute itself incorporates a formalist anal-
ysis in its asking about the amount of work borrowed, but it just as 
plainly calls for moving beyond the text to the author’s purpose, and 
to the effect of the work’s publication on the relevant market.317 Be-
cause of its sensitivity to findings of fact, fair use may be a poor can-
didate for a text-based formalist approach designed to cull cases at 
early stages, using rules and narrowing the scope of judicial in-
quiry.318 Finally, an undeniable part of fair use’s power lies in its abil-
ity to bless what might have looked like infringing cutting-edge 
technologies and forms of avant-garde expression. When the bounda-
ries between new and old are evolving and uncertain, a rules-based 
approach without flexibility may not adhere to copyright’s larger 
mandate to promote progress. It may trade clarity for adaptability and 
fairness. Thus, judges in fair use cases would do well to rely less 
heavily on text-based formalism, and litigants would do well to expect 
that many fair use cases will require broadening beyond the narrow 
scope of the work alone. 
Under a text-based formalism, judges would begin with formalist 
analysis and, only if necessary, proceed to a second tier of more fact-
intensive analysis. Intuition could play a role, but only in realms ap-
propriate for intuition alone, say, for instance, in the lay observer 
standard which is applied by the fact-finder. In the second tier of 
analysis, judges could select from contextualist, intentionalist, and 
other approaches to interpreting the works. Such an approach would 
make clear what methodology was being used and shine light on 
methodological abdication or unprincipled intuitionism when it oc-
curs. At times, judges simply conclude an issue, offering little other 
than an announcement with no method apparent or reasoning of-
fered.319 This has received some attention in the scholarship but could 
continue to benefit from further theorization.320 
Perhaps, as a policy matter, the lay observer standard is appropri-
ate for judicial intuitionism when judges, as fact-finders, substitute 
their judgment for that of the jury. This may be “a decision-making 
environment,” like those in which, as Professor Schauer has written, it 
may be normatively a good thing for decision makers not to have to 
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give reasons.321 If giving reasons means giving commitments, then 
perhaps it would overly constrain future judges to be bound to particu-
lar methods in arriving at a conclusion purporting to capture the lay 
observer’s perspective. Yet the problem with the current thinking is 
that intuitionism does effectively already make a choice. By assuming 
that they can discern the lay observer’s view of the works based on 
their own intuitive responses to the works before them, judges make a 
methodological choice. Such judges may not have given a reason, but 
at some level of generality they have made a kind of commitment. 
That commitment is to a standard that broadly accords judges the dis-
cretion to fill it through intuitive analysis. When one chooses an intui-
tive methodological approach, one is necessarily choosing it over oth-
other approaches.322 
Because intuitionism is a method (of sorts), but an extremely ma-
nipulable one that is difficult to evaluate on appeal, it ought to arise 
only in cases in which there is a strong argument that other methods 
are inadequate, from a text-based formalism perspective. A shift to an 
intuitionist method should not arise out of an outcome-determinative 
analysis that finds that, for example, a holistic approach is the sole 
way to arrive at a finding of infringement (as it was in Roth, the case 
that has come to stand for the total concept and feel test).323 If intui-
tionism adds depth or nuance to an already robust analysis, it may, 
perhaps, have some value for judicial reasoning. 
In sum, judges are the proper authority to make decisions of in-
terpretive choice in copyright law. When they confront matters of law, 
judges should adopt formalism unless the parties can rebut the pre-
sumption that formalism should operate, either by showing that a 
question of fact exists that would trigger a shift in method or by show-
ing that formalism will fail to capture some crucial aspect of the case. 
Nonetheless, judges should acknowledge the limits of formalism; 
sometimes other methods will be required, as when matters of fact 
arise or when doctrines arise that inherently require inquiry beyond 
the text, thus minimizing the utility of formalism. Judges should still 
be empowered to decide, as a matter of law, that a different interpre-
tive method is required and to acknowledge an occasionally inevitable 
broadening of scope. With greater guidance of interpretive choice in 
copyright law steering judicial analysis increasingly toward text-based 
formalism, outcomes can be more transparent, predictable, consistent, 
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and logical. Perhaps these preceding qualities will also increase fair-
ness. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Judges in copyright adjudication face numerous, inevitable, and 
difficult interpretive questions. Specifically, at recurring interpretive 
pressure points in their analysis judges must decide what interpretive 
methods to use, just as they would if they were adjudicating legally 
determinative textual objects such as contracts. Judges focus on cer-
tain sources for their interpretive authority, locating their choices 
somewhere along the Text/Context axis. They then deploy certain 
interpretive methods, somewhere along the Analysis/Intuition axis. 
This Article has shown how these choices implicate larger theoretical 
questions with real legal significance for outcomes. Far from having 
answered these questions, copyright scholarship has not yet really 
asked them in any systematic way. Moreover, these interpretive ques-
tions are not issues that arise in only a narrow stratum of difficult cas-
es. They arise in all copyright cases, just as interpretive questions can 
exist in all cases concerning contracts, wills, statutes,324 and the Con-
stitution; indeed, just as in those other areas, questions of interpretive 
method are often the hardest issues to decide. In that sense, copyright 
law is not meaningfully different from these other areas of law. 
Copyright law requires judges to act with interpretive precision, 
but it denies them meaningful, consistent guidance. It also empowers 
them to act with considerable discretion with regards to the interpre-
tive methods they use. Their decisions as to their interpretive authority 
are not made on the surface, and thus they are not explicitly reviewed 
on appeal. 
Streamlining and clarifying copyright adjudication through the 
adoption of defaults to the text over its context, and to analysis over 
intuition, could serve the values of transparency, predictability, effi-
ciency, and fairness. This would effectively reflect a shift from inter-
pretive chaos to interpretive order, from interpretive standards to 
interpretive rules. Additional changes could be contemplated in the 
rules around expert evidence. Many possible solutions exist. At a 
higher level of abstraction, any systematic change will require a juris-
prudentially informed discussion of the desirable scope of judicial 
authority as well as the tradeoffs of rules versus standards. At a much 
more immediate level, it requires awareness that what judges do with 
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the works they adjudicate in copyright cases is, like the works them-
selves, interpretively complex. Accordingly, interpretive choice 
should be understood to be a key part of the judicial work in copyright 
cases, thus meriting sustained scholarly attention and greater judicial 
awareness. Once it is acknowledged that interpretive pressure points 
are built into copyright law, the question of how judges do — and 
perhaps how they should — decide among interpretive approaches 
can rise to the surface. Where they fall along the Text/Context and 
Analysis/Intuition axes often matters to outcomes and should there-
fore be subject to the same sorts of rules that govern other factors that 
affect outcomes. At present, judges possess great discretion over their 
interpretive method selection, and the lack of any constraints mandat-
ing transparency or guiding their decision-making creates inconsisten-
cy and unpredictability. Accordingly, this Article addressed the 
benefits of a turn to text-based adjudication and analysis rather than 
intuition in the form of a two-tiered analysis. Under this proposal, 
judges would begin with text-based formalism to review issues arising 
as a matter of law, and then only move beyond formalism in cases 
where such an expansion is warranted and can be argued by the par-
ties or decided and justified by a judge. 
